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INTRODUCTION
Every year over $100 billion passes hands at death in the
United States.1 This passage of wealth brings into focus the
tension between the belief that people should be able to dispose
of their wealth as they wish and society's interest in maintain-
ing social stability. Nowhere is this tension more apparent
than in the doctrine of undue influence.
The concept of undue influence is part of the popular cul-
ture, with cases often rising to the level of "media events."
One need only open a newspaper to see a case involving this
doctrine-Doris Duke,2 Georgia O'Keeffe,3 J. Seward John-
1. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 72
(1990). We are in the process of the biggest transfer of wealth between gen-
erations in American history. See Thomas Watterson, Baby Boomers to In-
herit Vast but Uneven Wealth, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 1991, at Metro/Region
1. It has been estimated that over eight trillion dollars will be passed at death
over the next 20 years. Id.
2. Duke, the tobacco heiress, left an estate of $1.2 billion upon her death
in 1993. Duke left the bulk of her estate to charity. The will (which she
signed six months before her death) named her butler, Bernard Lafferty, as a
beneficiary as well as co-executor of the estate with the United States Trust
Company. Under the will, Lafferty would receive a five million dollar execu-
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son,4 and Pearl S. Buck5 are just some of the famous people
whose wills have been challenged based on the undue influence
tor's fee and a lifetime annuity of $500,000 per year. Lafferty would also be-
come a trustee of the newly created Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, which
is expected to be one of the largest charitable trusts in the country. Several
parties challenged the will on the basis that Lafferty unduly influenced Duke
to make changes in her will. In a separate action, the Manhattan Surrogate's
Court removed Lafferty as co-executor of the estate in 1995 due to his profli-
gate lifestyle after Duke's death. The court also removed the United States
Trust Company as co-executor for its failure to control Lafferty's spending and
to exercise independent judgment. Final legal action on the will is still pend-
ing. See Margaret A. Jacobs, U.S. Trust and Butler Dismissed as Duke Co-
Executors, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1995, at B5 (discussing the dismissal of the
co-executors due to mismanagement of the Duke fortune); James C. McKinley,
Jr., Judge Removes the Executors of Duke Estate, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995,
at Al (same); James C. McKinley, Jr., Stakes in the Duke Case: A Long Repu-
tation and a Lot of Dollars, N.Y. TImES, May 31, 1995, at B1 (examining the
questionable conduct of United States Trust and the Chicago law firm that
drafted Duke's will).
3. When O'Keeffe, the painter, died in 1986 at age 98, the principal
beneficiary of her will was Juan Hamilton, who was 58 years her junior. An
aspiring but nearly destitute artist, Hamilton had knocked on O'Keeffe's door
one morning in August of 1973 seeking work. He never left. OKeeffe initially
employed Hamilton as her secretary, but he ultimately became her assistant,
agent, business manager, companion and caretaker. After O'Keeffe's death,
her 92-year-old sister and a niece challenged the will, claiming Hamilton ex-
ercised undue influence. Although the family members had not maintained
contact with O'Keeffe while she was living (her niece stated that she met the
artist only twice), the parties reached a settlement whereby the two contest-
ants each received one million dollars in art. The remainder of the estate was
split between Hamilton, eight museums and a foundation to be run by Hamil-
ton, two family members, and two institutional representatives. See Andrew
Decker, The Battle over Georgia O'Keeffe's Multimillion-Dollar Legacy,
ARTNEWs, Apr. 1987, at 120 (discussing the value of O'Keeffe's estate and the
eventual settlement between Hamilton and family members); Jo Ann Lewis,
The War over O'Keeffe: The Artist's Heir, Juan Hamilton, and the Legal
Wrangling that Followed Her Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1987, at Dl
(recounting Hamilton's relationship with O'Keeffe).
4. Johnson, the heir of the Johnson & Johnson fortune, died in 1983,
leaving an estate of just over $400 million. He left the bulk of his estate to his
third wife, the former Barbara Piasecka. Johnson first met Piasecka in 1968
when she was working as a cook at Johnson's New Jersey estate. At the time,
Johnson was 73 years old and married; Piasecka was 31 and single. Johnson
began almost immediately to give Piasecka increasingly responsible positions,
to spend time with her regularly, and to lavish expensive gifts on her. John-
son divorced his wife in 1971 and married Piasecka eight days later. Over the
following years, Johnson executed a series of wills and codicils, increasing his
new wife's share of the estate and disinheriting his children. Upon his death,
his six children and a charitable foundation named in the will challenged
Johnson's final will, executed weeks before his death, on the basis of insuffi-
cient mental capacity and undue influence by Johnson's new wife and lawyer.
The parties finally settled the case. Johnson's new wife received about $340
million outright, the children each received about $6 million, the charitable
1997]
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doctrine in recent years. Moreover, the prevalence of this doc-
trine is not limited to the rich and famous. In conjunction with
lack of mental capacity, undue influence is the most frequent
ground for invalidating a will.6 In addition, for every reported
case there are many more cases that settle before trial or even
before the filing of a suit.' And yet, despite its prominence, lit-
tle scholarly work has been done examining the parameters
and justification of the undue influence doctrine. 8
foundation received $20 million, and the lawyer's fee as executor was slashed
to $1.8 million. See generally DAvID MARGOLICi, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE
EPIc BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993) (recalling Pi-
asecka's life, her relationship with the Johnson family and the controversial
settlement of the Johnson estate).
5. Buck, the novelist, left the majority of her estate to Theodore Harris,
a former Arthur Murray dance instructor who first met her in 1963 when he
was assigned to give her private dance instruction. At the time, he was 32 and
she was 71. Mr. Harris became her business manager and constant compan-
ion until her death ten years later. Her will effectively disinherited her seven
adopted children. The court rejected the will based on undue influence. Pearl
Buck's Will Is Upset by Jury, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1974, at A27.
6. Jeffrey A- Schoenblum, Will Contests: An Empirical Study, 22 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 607, 647-49 (1987).
7. See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043 (1994)
for a discussion of the prevalence of strike suits in this area of law as well as
suggestions for how to change our system to avoid such suits.
8. The literature on undue influence generally falls into three distinct
categories: (1) descriptive articles, usually in the form of student notes or case
comments, laying out the elements of the undue influence doctrine and de-
scribing case law (see, e.g., A.J. White Hutton, Undue Influence and Fraud in
Wills: What Constitutes Undue Influence and Fraud, and How They Are
Proven, 37 DICK. L. REV. 16, 17-20 (1932) (distinguishing undue influence
from the subject of testamentary capacity and discussing forms of undue in-
fluence); Christopher B. Swartley, Blackmer v. Blackmer: The Presumption of
Undue Influence in Montana, 37 MONT. L. REV. 250, 254 (1976) (maintaining
that Montana should adopt a rule that allows for a presumption of undue in-
fluence); Joseph Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mistake in Wills, 41
HARV. L. REV. 309, 327 (1927) (listing instances of undue influence in case
law); Wendell B. Will, Comment, Wills-Undue Influence, 50 MICH. L. REV.
748, 749 (1952) (discussing the definition and elements of undue influence));
(2) empirical studies exploring the application of the doctrine (see, e.g.,
Schoenblum, supra note 6, at 647 (stating that undue influence is one of the
most common grounds for invalidating a will)); and (3) articles criticizing
courts for using the undue influence doctrine to impose their views as to ap-
propriate testamentary norms (see, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Tes-
tamentary Freedom, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996) (criticizing courts for
using undue influence to impose testamentary norms); Josef Athanas, Com-
ment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL
F. 529, 545-46 (1990) (arguing that juries should not decide will contests); Mi-
chael Falker, Comment, A Case Against Admitting into Evidence the Disposi-
tive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2
CONN. L. REV. 616, 621 (1970) (proposing that dispositive elements of a will
should not factor into a determination of testamentary capacity)).
[Vol. 81:571574
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All wills are the result of influence.9 The law recognizes
this by drawing a distinction between influence and undue in-
fluence.1" According to the dominant paradigm, the key dis-
tinction is that undue influence involves the substitution of the
mind of the person exercising the influence for the mind of the
person executing the instrument, resulting in an instrument
that would otherwise not have been made."1 Understood in
9. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. REV. 253, 264 (1947) (stating that complete freedom of testation is
never realized). Professor Dawson has noted that it is not possible to "entirely
eliminate the pressures that operate on [individuals] ... or insulate them from
all the multiplied stimuli of a complex social environment. The problem... is to
select the means of pressure that are permissible." Id.
10. This is unusual in the law of wils. Compare this to other doctrines
such as fraud and duress. These doctrines do not recognize degrees of per-
missibility. If a will is brought about as the result of lies then it is irrelevant
that the lies were only little ones. It is sufficient that the bad conduct had the
desired result.
11. See Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P.D. 81, 82-83 (1885) (discussing when
influence becomes undue influence under the law). Lord Hannen gave a clas-
sic explanation of undue influence more than 110 years ago in the often
quoted English case of Wingrove v. Wingrove:
We are all familiar with the use of the word "influence"; we say that
one person has an unbounded influence over another, and we speak
of evil influences and good influences, but it is not because one person
has unbounded influence over another that therefore when exercised,
even though it may be very bad indeed, it is undue influence in the
legal sense of the word. To give you some illustrations of what I
mean, a young man may be caught in the toils of a harlot, who makes
use of her influence to induce him to make a will in her favour, to the
exclusion of his relatives. It is unfortunately quite natural that a
man so entangled should yield to that influence and confer large
bounties on the person with whom he has been brought into such re-
lation; yet the law does not attempt to guard against those contin-
gencies. A man may be the companion of another, and may encour-
age him in evil courses, and so obtain what is called an undue
influence over him, and the consequence may be a will made in his
favour. But that again, shocking as it is, perhaps even worse than
the other, will not amount to undue influence.
To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be-to
sum it up in a word-coercion.... It is only when the will of the per-
son who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she
does not desire to do, that it is undue influence.
Id. at 82.
For further discussion of this distinction, see THOMAS E. ATIUNsON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 256, 260 (2d ed. 1953) and WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 278 (1988), which ex-
plain the legal definition of undue influence. For recent case examples dis-
cussing this distinction see Caudill v. Smith, 450 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994), which states that undue influence prevents the testator from exercising
his or her own will; Taliaferro v. Green, 622 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981), overruled on other grounds by Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384
1997] 575
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this way, the undue influence doctrine is akin to the doctrines
of fraud and duress in its attempt to protect testators' rights to
freely dispose of their property.12 Thus, if an aged testator
leaves everything to his nurse of one month, disinheriting his
family, a court's finding of undue influence will be justified on
the basis that the will does not represent the testator's true
wishes. Because the dominant paradigm presents the undue
influence doctrine as providing the double benefit of protecting
freedom of testation as well as preventing overreaching by oth-
ers, the doctrine has received wide support.13
In this article I challenge the dominant paradigm. I show
that rather than furthering freedom of testation, the undue in-
fluence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who de-
viate from judicially imposed testamentary norms-in particu-
lar, the norm that people should provide for their families.
Although some scholars have recognized that the undue influ-
ence doctrine has sometimes been used by courts and juries to
impose their views as to appropriate testamentary norms, they
have consistently presented this phenomenon as a misapplica-
tion of the undue influence doctrine. 4 These scholars believe
(Tenn. 1995), also noting that undue influence prevents a testator from exer-
cising his or her own will; and Schmidt v. Schwear, 424 N.E.2d 401, 405 (IlM.
App. Ct. 1981), which held that legal undue influence deprives the testator of
free agency.
12. The doctrine of fraud prevents wills from being given effect when the
will is brought about through lies told to the testator. The doctrine of duress
prevents wills from being given effect when the wills are brought about
through threats of harm. The undue influence doctrine is broader than the
doctrines of fraud and duress in that it invalidates wills when they are the
result of any action that subverts the will of the testator and replaces the will
of the testator with that of the one doing the influencing. See generally
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 278-79, 580 (comparing the doctrines of
fraud, duress, and undue influence in will contests).
13. For example, although scholars have at various times suggested
eliminating the requirement for mental capacity (see, e.g., Mary Louise Fel-
lows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1109-12
(1980)) and eliminating the requirements of testamentary formalities (see,
e.g., James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68
N.C. L. REV. 541, 543 (1990) (discussing the developments in the law that
make attestation unnecessary)), the undue influence doctrine has remained
sacrosanct (see, e.g., Fellows, supra, at 1113 (reaffiing the importance of
the undue influence doctrine)).
14. See, e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from
Meretricious Relationship: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 200, 202-07 (1989) (discussing courts' use of the undue
influence doctrine to show disfavor for meretricious relationships); Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REv.
225, 243-48 (1981) (criticizing the higher burden of showing testamentary ca-
576 [Vol. 81:571
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that the doctrine protects freedom of testation so long as courts
resist the temptation to impose their views as to appropriate
testamentary norms. 15 In this article, I argue that this ap-
proach fails to recognize that family protectionism is built into
the very fabric of the undue influence doctrine. Rather than
resulting from a misapplication of the doctrine, I show how the
correct application of the doctrine imposes a preference for the
biological family over non-family members. The doctrine does
not act to protect the intent of the testator, but rather to pro-
tect the testator's biological family from disinheritance.
Part I looks at how case law, treatises and other authori-
tative sources describe undue influence as a doctrine that pro-
tects testamentary freedom. Part II studies the dominant
paradigm more closely by looking at the application of the doc-
trine to a specific undue influence case, In re Will of Kauf-
mann.16 In this case the court set aside a will in which the tes-
tator left the majority of his estate to his long time live-in
companion. While commentators have criticized the case as a
misapplication of the undue influence doctrine, 7 I show that
its result flows directly from the standard undue influence doc-
trinal analysis. Part III explores the paradox of the undue in-
fluence doctrine. The doctrine purports to protect freedom of
testation, yet, as Kaufmann illustrates, the standards for un-
due influence can be met even when the will reflects the wishes
of the testator. I show how this seeming paradox results from
presumptions underlying the undue influence doctrine, namely
the confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy. This
dichotomy can be understood in the broader context of the
market/family dichotomy, which views the market as a place
pacity in cases involving homosexual testators); Note, Will Contests on Trial,
6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 95-101 (1953) (acknowledging misuse of the undue influ-
ence doctrine by juries and courts).
15. See Athanas, supra note 8, at 531 (proposing the abolition of jury tri-
als in will contests); Falker, supra note 8, at 616-18 (proposing bifurcating the
will contest proceeding so that the decision as to whether the testator was un-
der undue influence or lacked mental capacity is made without regard to the
dispositive provisions in the will).
16. 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
17. See Sherman, supra note 14, at 243-48 (suggesting that the Kauffman
court used the undue influence doctrine to conceal its views concerning homo-
sexuality). But see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAWYERS: A
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 243-46 (1970) (approving of the Kauffnan court's use
of the undue influence doctrine because the case involved the "conscious ma-
nipulation" of the testator). See generally deFuria, supra note 14 (criticizing
juries' use of the undue influence doctrine to impose their views of testamen-
tary norms in contests involving meretricious relationships).
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governed by an ethic of selfish individualism and the family as
a place governed by an ethic of altruism.
Part IV tests this new paradigm of the undue influence
doctrine as a family protection doctrine by looking at how the
existence or nonexistence of other provisions protecting the
family against disinheritance affects the operation of the doc-
trine. By examining the application of the undue influence
doctrine in two states that represent the extremes in terms of
family protection, I reveal the strong correlation between the
existence of other family protection provisions and the appli-
cation of the undue influence doctrine. Part V concludes by
exploring whether the undue influence doctrine can be justified
once it is understood in terms of family protection, rather than
as a doctrine committed to preserving freedom of testation. In
particular, I look at three possible justifications for the opera-
tion of the undue influence doctrine as a family protection doc-
trine regardless of evidence of testamentary intent.
I. UNDUE INFLUENCE UNDER THE DOMINANT
PARADIGM
According to authoritative sources, undue influence occurs
when a person is subject to such psychological domination by
another that he cannot help but carry out the other person's
wishes.' 8 The distinction between permissible influence and
impermissible undue influence is that the latter involves the
substitution of the mind of the person exercising the influence
for the mind of the person executing the instrument, causing
him to make an instrument that he otherwise would not have
made. 9 According to the dominant paradigm, courts should
not give effect to this instrument because it does not accurately
18. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
40 & n.66 (2d ed. 1994).
19. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Schwear, 424 N.E.2d 401, 405 (M. App. Ct. 1981)
("Undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will is that influence which pre-
vents the testator from exerting his own will in the disposition of his estate.");
Taliaferro v. Green, 622 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), overruled on
other grounds by Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. 1995) (explaining
that to render a will nugatory, undue influence must "amount to coercion");
ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 256, 260 (noting that undue influence is often
defined as coercing the testator to do something that the testator did not de-
sire to do); McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 278 ("Most judicial definitions
of undue influence speak of domination of the testator's mind; was it so con-
trolled that the will is actually 'the will of another person,' or did the testator
act of his own accord.").
578 [Vol. 81:571
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reflect the wishes of the testator. In signing a will that is the
result of undue influence, the testator is said to be in such a
condition that if he could speak his wishes to the last, he would
say, "This is not my wish, but I must do it."20
The dominant paradigm views the undue influence doc-
trine as related to, but different from, the doctrines of fraud
and duress. The doctrine of fraud prevents a will from being
given effect when the will is brought about through lies told to
the testator.21 The doctrine of duress prevents a will from be-
ing given effect when the will is brought about through threats
20. In re Weeks' Estate, 103 A.2d 43, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1954)
(quoting Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P.D. 81, 83 (1885)). As one recent case
explained:
Before a will may be set aside because of undue influence, a contest-
ant must prove the existence and exertion of an influence that sub-
verted or overpowered the mind of the testator at the time of execu-
tion of the instrument so that the testator executed an instrument he
would not otherwise have executed but for such influence. Not every
influence exerted on a person is undue. It is not undue unless the
free agency of the testator was destroyed and the will produced ex-
presses the wishes of the one exerting the influence. One may re-
quest, importune, or entreat another to create a favorable dispositive
instrument, but unless the importunities or entreaties are shown to
be so excessive as to subvert the will of the maker, they will not taint
the validity of the instrument.
Mackie v. McKenzie, 900 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (citations omit-
ted). Another court described undue influence as "an excessive or inordinate
influence considering the circumstances of the particular case." In re Norton,
C.A. No. 11976-NC, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *16-17 (Del. Ch. May 16,
1995), aff/d sub nom. Norton v. Norton (In re Will of Norton), 672 A.2d 53 (Del.
1996). The court noted:
The degree of influence to be exerted over the mind of the testatrix in
order to be regarded as undue must be such as to subjugate [her]
mind to the will of another, to overcome [her] free agency and inde-
pendent volition and to compel [her] to make a will that speaks the
mind of another and not [her] own.
Id.
2L See, e.g., Wall v. Heller, 486 A.2d 764, 773 (Md. 1985) ("Fraud connotes
that the testat[or] either did not know that [he] was signing a will, or that [he]
was misled or deceived as to the provisions of the will."); Matter of Estate of
Vick, 557 So. 2d 760, 767 (Miss. 1989) ("The basic ingredient of fraud.., is that
the testator is deceived through the use of false information, so that his free
will or free agency, of which he is not deprived, is exercised upon the basis of
false information."); Matter of Weickum's Estate, 317 N.W.2d 142, 146 (S.D.
1982) ("Fraud in the inducement of a will consists of false statements of fact
willfully made by a beneficiary to a testator, which are made in bad faith or
with the intent of deceiving the testator, and which do deceive him and induce
him to make a will he would not otherwise have made."); Union Planters Natl
Bank of Memphis v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) ("In
order to set aside a will on the basis of fraud, the fraud must be of the active,
tortious, deceitful kind and not of the constructive or resultant nature.").
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of harm to the testator.2 The undue influence doctrine is
broader than each of these in that it invalidates a will when it
is the result of any action that subverts the will of the testator
and replaces the will of the testator with that of the one influ-
encing. 2  As one court stated, "[I]t is immaterial how this is
done, whether by solicitation, flattery, putting in fear or some
other manner."24  Indeed even kindness and affection can re-
sult in undue influence .2  Although the doctrines of fraud and
22. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 279 (explaining that
"[d]uress is closely associated with undue influence" and that "[i]t requires an
'unlawful' threat"). Compare Bailey v. Arlington Bank & Trust Co., in which
the court stated:
It has been held that duress is the threat to do some act which the
threatening party has no right to do. The threat must be of such a
character to destroy the free agency of the party to whom it is di-
rected. It must overcome his will and cause him to do that which he
would not otherwise do, and which he was not legally bound to do.
The restraint caused by such duress must be imminent, and must be
such that the person to whom it is directed has no means of protec-
tion.
693 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
23. As one prominent commentator has stated: "It is not the nature and
extent of the influence, but its effect upon the mind of the testator which de-
termines whether it is undue influence or not." 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE &
DOUGLAS H. PARKER, REVISED TREATISE: PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.6(1960). For the most part, courts continue to honor the traditional definition
of undue influence. However, "[a] few courts have defined it as unethical con-
duct in relation to a testator to obtain an advantage which the law will not
countenance." HASKELL, supra note 18, at 43. Other courts have historically
viewed influence in terms of coercion. See ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 256
(discussing undue influence in terms of coercion); George B. Collins, Undue
Influence in Wills, 7 AR. L. REV. 116, 116-18 (1952-1953) (same).
English courts have gone the other way and view undue influence as
something separate and apart from fraud. According to the English courts,
undue influence does not involve falsehoods. See SHAFFER, supra note 17, at
259.
24. In re Estate of Holmes, C.A. No. 13034, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at
*13 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1994); see also BOWE & PARKER, supra note 23, § 15.7
(noting that "no exhaustive list can be made of the means by which undue in-
fluence can be exerted").
25. See Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(explaining that "although kindness and attention alone would not constitute
undue influence, they might, when combined with other factors, amount to
such influence"). But see In re Estate of Weir, 475 F.2d 988, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as
'undue' if no imposition or fraud be practiced even though it induces the testa-
tor to make an unequal disposition of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort."). In Weir, the fact that the testator was a lifelong
bachelor who had no children and was predeceased by his siblings may have
influenced the court's decision. Weir left the bulk of his estate to his longtime
female friend and companion. Although they had separate apartments, they
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duress in the context of testamentary dispositions continue to
exist in theory, the law of undue influence has largely sup-
planted them. The reason for this is that undue influence is
much easier to prove, requiring no direct evidence of malfea-
sance by (or on behalf of) the named beneficiary.2 6
According to the doctrine's precepts, in applying the undue
influence doctrine, a court should always be mindful of the
overarching principle of freedom of testation. Thus, when a
court rejects application of the undue influence doctrine, it of-
ten does so with strong rhetoric in support of freedom of testa-
tion. As one court stated in refusing to apply the undue influ-
ence doctrine:
We remind ourselves that neither judge nor jury may make a will for
the decedent. If he had the mental capacity to make a will, and if he
made it of his own volition, so that it may be said to be his will and
not that of another, then it is not our place to pass judgment on his
motives or his wisdom in making the will he made, nor to substitute
our own judgment for his. One has the right to do as he pleases with
what is his
27
shared each other's company, traveled together and took their meals together.
Id. at 990. Wier's niece unsuccessfully challenged the will.
26. In order to prove fraud, the contestant needs to put forward evidence
of deceit. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. Greenspoon, 411 A.2d 979, 983 (D.C. 1980)
("To establish an action for fraud in the inducement, appellant would have to
prove that (1) willful false statements of fact were made to the testator; (2)
the statements were made by a beneficiary under the will that was induced;
(3) the statements were intended to deceive the testator; (4) the testator was
actually deceived; (5) the statements actually induced the testator to make a
will; and (6) the testator would not have made the induced will absent the
false statements."); Gill v. Gill, 254 S.E.2d 122, 125 (Va. 1979) ("Fraud... [is]
not to be presumed, but must be proven by evidence clear, cogent, and con-
vincing. The ultimate burden of proof is always upon him who alleges
fraud.").
In order to prove duress, the contestant needs to put forward evidence as
to threats of harm.
The test of what act or threat constitutes duress is determined by
considering whether the threat placed the party entering into the
transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will
and judgment .... By definition, an act or threat to constitute du-
ress must be wrongful.
Dunbar v. Dunbar, 429 P.2d 949, 952-53 (Ariz. 1967).
27. In re Estate of Hague, 894 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); see
also Will of Bartel, 613 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (Surr. Ct. 1994) (failing to find un-
due influence absent proof that the primary beneficiary acted so as to substi-
tute the testator's will with his own), affd sub nom. Cordovi v. Karnbad, 625
N.Y.S.2d 519 (App. Div. 1995); Wendell B. Will, Comment, 50 MICH. L. REV.
748, 749 (1951) (arguing that undue influence exists when a testator lacks the
ability to weigh all influences against him, both due and undue).
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Rhetoric notwithstanding, however, rather than protecting
individual autonomy, the standards for proving undue influ-
ence instead can have the effect of denying freedom of testation
for those individuals who deviate from judicially imposed socie-
tal norms as to appropriate testamentary behavior.28
A. PROVING UNDUE INFLUENCE
Under the dominant paradigm, the existence of undue in-
fluence is a question about the state of mind of a person who is
dead at the time of inquiry. Thus, it is not surprising that it
can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. 29 This only begs
the question, however, of what circumstances indicate that a
will is the product of another's wishes.30
Courts have looked to a variety of factors in determining
whether the testator was subject to undue influence. Four
elements of proof have emerged: 1) a confidential relationship
existed between the testator and the person allegedly exercis-
ing the influence; 2) the confidant played some role, however
indirect, in the formulation, preparation or execution of the
28. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Kaufmann court used the undue influence doctrine to impose societal norms
of the time regarding appropriate testamentary behavior).
29. As one commentator has stated, "That an individual may come under
such influence of another that he cannot resist what the other wants him to
do is plausible, but proving such psychological domination directly is virtually
impossible." HASKELL, supra note 18, at 40; see also, e.g., Pruss v. Pruss, 514
N.W.2d 335, 346 (Neb. 1994) (noting that undue influence "is usually shown
through inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
testator"); In re Andrews' Will, 261 S.E.2d 198, 199 (N.C. 1980) (explaining
that "after testator's death, only circumstantial evidence remains from which
the trier of fact... could find undue influence").
30. One authority has provided this rather tautological answer: "[Tlo es-
tablish undue influence it must be proved that the testator was susceptible to
undue influence, that the influencer had the disposition and opportunity to
exercise undue influence, and that the disposition is the result of the influ-
ence." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 161 (5th ed. 1995). However, this answer begs the question insofar
as it does not tell us what influence is undue. Another commentator describes
the difficulty of proving undue influence as follows: "As in the case of mental
capacity, we are dealing largely with subjective elements. Furthermore any
objective phases of undue influence are apt to be veiled in secrecy." ATKIN-
SON, supra note 11, at 255. As one court has stated, "The overriding question
in deciding if a will has been executed under undue influence is whether the
influencer, by his or her conduct, has gained an unfair advantage by means
that reasonable persons regard as improper." Van Marter v. Van Marter, 882
P.2d 134, 137 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (citing In re Reddaway's Estate, 329 P.2d
886, 890 (Or. 1958)).
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will; 3) the testator was susceptible to undue influence; and 4)
the testator made a testamentary gift to the confidant which
was unnatural.H" The following discussion outlines how each of
these factors has been interpreted by the courts.
1. Confidential Relationship
The confidential relationship is the linchpin of the undue
influence inquiry. Many courts have taken the position that
the mere existence of a confidential relationship combined with
a benefit to the dominant party in the relationship is enough to
raise the presumption of undue influence. 32
What is a confidential relationship? It is generally defined
as a relationship of trust and reliance whereby the testator
reasonably believed that the confidant was acting in the testa-
tor's best interest.33 The rationale for the presumption of un-
due influence seems to be that where the testator is dependent
or relies on a person, then that person can use his position to
overwhelm the testator's free will.
Confidential relationships can be understood as both a
form and an extension of fiduciary relationships. Confidential
relationships are forms of fiduciary relationships in that cer-
tain relationships are categorized as "confidential" as a matter
of law. A classic example of such a de jure confidential rela-
tionship is that of a lawyer and client.34 Similarly, confidential
31. HASKELL, supra note 18, at 42. Factors that other courts will con-
sider include changes from a previous will and whether the new will was
drawn hastily or in secret. See, e.g., Evans v. Liston 568 P.2d 1116, 1118
(Ariz. 1977) (stating that a hastily executed will serves as evidence of undue
influence); Moore v. Smith, 582 A.2d 1237, 1239 (Md. 1990) (stating that
changes from a former will serve as evidence of undue influence). Some
courts have refused to set forth any test at all, stating:
It is impossible to set forth all the various combinations of factors and
circumstances that are sufficient to make out a case of undue influ-
ence because the possibilities are as limitless as the imagination of
the adroit and the cunning. The very nature of undue influence
makes it impossible for the law to lay down tests to determine its ex-
istence with mathematical certainty.
Matter of Coley's Will, 280 S.E.2d 770, 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (citing In re
Beale's Will, 163 S.E. 684, 686 (N.C. 1932)).
32. See, e.g., Summit Bank v. Quake, 631 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that undue influence is presumed when a plaintiff establishes
the existence of a confidential relationship and an advantage received by the
dominant party).
33. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (describing the fiduciary
nature of a confidential relationship).
34. See McGOvERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 280 (stating that an attor-
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relationships also presumptively exist between a conservator
and ward, trustee and beneficiary, doctor and patient, nurse-
companion and patient, and pastor and parishioner. 5 In all of
these relationships one person is under a legal or ethical obli-
gation to act in the best interest of the other person.
A confidential relationship is also an extension of fiduciary
relationships in that, under the undue influence doctrine, con-
fidential relationships may also exist between people who do
not fall within any specifically defined category.36 A de facto
confidential relationship comes about "whenever trust and
confidence are placed by one person in the integrity and fidelity
of another."37 It exists "whenever one person has reposed a
special confidence in another to the extent that the parties do
not deal with each other on equal terms, either because of an
overmastering dominance on one side, or weakness, depend-
ence or justifiable trust, on the other."38  Some examples of
these types of confidential relationships are friends, neighbors
and lovers on whom the testator has become dependent.39 De
facto confidential relationships differ from de jure confidential
relationships because there is no generally recognized legal or
ethical obligation to act in the other person's best interest.
An obvious example of relationships in which people re-
pose special confidences in one another are family relation-
ships. However, the undue influence doctrine only categorizes
family relationships as "confidential" in very limited circum-
stances.40
ney-client relationship is presumed confidential); see also, e.g., Estate of Auen,
35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).(stating that the law presumes a
confidential relationship when an attorney acts for a client); Tracey v. Tracey,
153 A. 80, 84 (Md. 1931) (same).
35. See McGovERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 280 & nn.29-34 (describing
relationships that are presumed confidential).
36. Id.; see also In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273 (Okla. 1995)
(stating that confidential relationships are not limited "to persons who stand
vis-a-vis one another in certain limited classes.., since dependent relations
may occur in any number of different settings").
37. Maheras, 897 P.2d at 272 n.10 (citing Fipps v. Stidham, 50 P.2d 680,
683 (Okla. 1935)).
38. In re Clark's Estate, 359 A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1976) (citation omitted).
Another court recently defined a confidential relationship as one which would
induce a reasonably prudent person to repose trust and confidence in another.
Maheras, 897 P.2d at 272.
39. See HASKELL, supra note 18, at 48 & nn.83-84 (giving examples of re-
lationships which courts have found to be confidential).
40. The term "confidential relationship" has different meanings in differ-
ent contexts. For purposes of determining the existence of a constructive
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The parent-child relationship is one in which there is fre-
quently dependence: a child is dependent on a parent when the
child is young and a parent is often dependent on a child when
the parent is old. Nonetheless, courts are reluctant to catego-
rize such relationships as confidential. For example, in one re-
cent case there was ample evidence of dependence by the
mother on her son, who handled all of her financial and per-
sonal affairs. The court, in refusing to find a confidential rela-
tionship, stated:
From our perspective, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from
the evidence with regard to the question of dominance is that the de-
fendant cared for his mother in an attempt to make her life easier at
a time when she needed him most. Evidence of concern and care on
the part of a child and the acceptance of that care by the parent
should not be equated with subservience on the part of the parent or
dominance on the part of the child.41
Courts are particularly reluctant to characterize a rela-
tionship as confidential in the situation where the court finds
the disposition to that child to be "natural."42 Presumably this
is in silent recognition that to do so would raise an inference
that a disposition to that child was procured through undue
influence.
Courts are even more reluctant to characterize a relation-
ship between a husband and a wife as confidential. 43 Many
courts have held that there is no presumption of a confidential
relationship between a husband and wife even where there is
evidence of a spouse using influence to compel the execution of
trust, a confidential relationship typically involves those related by blood or
marriage. GEORGE E. PALMER, IV THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 19.3, at 112 &
n.22 (1978).
41. Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1994). In this case,
The evidence [was] undisputed that the defendant helped his mother
write her checks and handle her affairs and arranged to have the
deed prepared and her signature notarized. However.... evidence
of this nature, without more, is simply not sufficient to justify a
finding of subservience on the part of the parent, so as to create a le-
gal presumption of undue influence.
Id. at 994.
42. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing how courts
have determined what constitutes a "natural" disposition).
43. This seems particularly peculiar in light of the fact that a common
feature of the traditional marital relationship is reliance on a spouse to act in
one's best interest. See, for example, Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 318(1969), in which the Court described a situation in which "[the wife] took no
interest and no part in business affairs and relied upon her husband's judg-
ment" and "[wlhenever some formal action was required regarding property in
her name, decedent would have the appropriate instrument prepared and she
would execute it."
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a will favorable to the spouse." Indeed, some courts have gone
so far as to hold as a matter of law that there is no such thing
as a confidential relationship between a husband and wife.4"
In states that recognize the possibility of a confidential rela-
tionship between spouses, courts generally limit this applica-
tion to situations in which the spouse is a second spouse and
the testator's children from a prior marriage have been disin-
herited."
2. Confidant's Role in the Execution of the Will
The second factor that courts examine in determining
whether a will is the result of undue influence is whether the
confidant played some role in the execution of the will. One of
the strongest examples of such involvement is when a lawyer
drafts a will of which he is a primary beneficiary.4" However,
44. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 87 N.W. 39, 42 (Neb. 1901) (stating that al-
though confidential relations generally raise a strong suspicion of undue in-
fluence, "this is not true to the same extent of the relation of husband and
wife, where . . . the relation has subsisted for a long time, under circum-
stances which give rise to a very strong legitimate influence, and the disposi-
tion in question is not unjust or unnatural"); In re Detsch's Estate, 229 P.2d
264, 266 (Or. 1951) (stating that "the influence of a... spouse to make a will
in [his or her] favor, in the absence of a showing that it was improperly exer-
cised, does not vitiate the will, even though there may be proof that such a
provision would not have been made but for such importunity" and that "[tihe
mere fact that a wife guides or even dominates her husband, or has acquired
an ascendancy over him, does not render his will made in her favor invalid")
(quoting 68 C.J. Wills § 442, at 752)).
45. Robert Whitman & David Hoopes, The Confidential Relationship in
Will Contests, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Feb. 1985, at 53 (citing Knight's Estate,
108 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). The authors note that in justi-
fying this restriction on the presumption of undue influence, some courts have
found that influence arising between a husband and wife is always proper,
going so far as to state that it would be "monstrous" to deny faithful spouses
the right to express their desires in disposing of each others property. Id. at
54 (citing Estate of Robinson, 644 P.2d 420, 426 (Kan. 1982)).
46. See, e.g., Needels v. Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that a second wife used threats of divorce to unduly influence her
husband into changing his will so as to disinherit his natural children in favor
of his step-son).
47. See, e.g., Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a presumption of undue influence arises when an attorney, act-
ing as such, participates in the making or execution of a will of which he is a
beneficiary); Kirschbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 (Ohio 1991)
(holding that naming as a beneficiary in a client's will an attorney who is not
related to the testator in blood or marriage creates a presumption of undue
influence). Going one step further, California enacted a statute invalidating
any bequest to a lawyer who drafts the particular will unless the lawyer is
related to the testator by blood or marriage. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (West
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such direct involvement is not required to prove undue influ-
ence. Involvement is sufficient if the beneficiary directed the
testator to the drafting lawyer, made the appointment for the
testator, or even merely knew of the contents of the will.48 In-
deed, some courts have dispensed with this requirement alto-
gether if the drafting lawyer is found not to have been suffi-
ciently diligent in questioning the motives of the testator.49
Just as courts are reluctant to find a confidential relation-
ship between family members,5 0 courts are similarly often re-
luctant to find that the participation requirement has been met
1994). A related statute allows an exception if the testator consults an inde-
pendent lawyer who attaches a "Certificate of Independent Review" to the
will; the certificate must state that the reviewing lawyer has concluded that
the bequest to the drafting lawyer is not the result of undue influence, fraud,
or duress. Id. § 21351(b) (West Supp. 1995). See generally DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 30, at 169-72 (describing the general presumption that
an attorney has a confidential relationship with a client when preparing that
client's will); McGOvERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 283-85 (same); Joseph W.
deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts from Client to the Attorney-Draftsmen: From
Probate Presumption to Ethical Prohibition, 66 NEB. L. REv. 695, 697-718
(1987) (describing the evolution of the treatment of cases in which a drafting
attorney was the beneficiary of a will).
48. See, e.g., Smith v. Welch, 597 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Ark. 1980) (holding
that the procurement of a will by a beneficiary created a rebuttable presump-
tion of undue influence); In re Estate of Larson, 394 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (finding undue influence when a beneficiary, the decedent's
son, suggested that the will be changed and participated with lawyers in
drawing up the new will); In re Estate of Skrtic, 108 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 1954)
(holding a will invalid when a beneficiary, the decedent's daughter and care--
taker, procured a lawyer and directed the drafting of the will's terms); In re
Estate of Forde, No. 85-0724, 1986 WL 217312, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. June 25,
1986) (finding undue influence when a beneficiary took the testator to an at-
torney and was present during the drafting of the will); ATKINSON, supra note
11, at 262 (stating that an attorney-beneficiary "who participates in procuring
the will is in the same position as the actual draftsman").
49. See, e.g., In re Moses' Will, 227 So. 2d 829, 837 (Miss. 1969) (setting
aside a will on the basis of undue influence when the testator's will left most
of her estate to an attorney with whom she had a long-term personal relation-
ship). Although the beneficiary played no role in the execution of the will, the
court held that the testator did not receive "meaningful independent advice or
counsel" because the drafting attorney's role had been "little more than that of
a scrivener." Id. at 834. As such, there was insufficient evidence to overcome
the presumption of undue influence. This case may have been affected by the
fact that the beneficiary was an attorney. In In re Henderson, the New York
Court of Appeals stated that even bequests to an attorney who did not draft
the testator's will should be subject to special scrutiny "since the intensely
personal nature of the attorney-client relationship.., places attorneys in po-
sitions that are uniquely suited to exercising a powerful influence over their
clients' decision." 605 N.E.2d 323, 327 (N.Y. 1992).
50. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the reluctance
of courts to label a relationship between family members as "confidential").
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when family members are involved, in spite of the low stan-
dard of proof usually required for this element. Courts often
view such involvement as natural and therefore characterize
participation in the execution of the will as "'perfunctory physi-
cal activities' rather than active procurement."
51
3. Testator's Susceptibility to Undue Influence
It is often said that in order to sustain a claim for undue
influence, there must be some proof that the testator was sus-
ceptible to it.52 A testator is considered to be susceptible if he
is elderly, sick, or has mental problems.53 However, suscepti-
bility to undue influence can also be shown by circumstantial
51. Carter v. Carter, 526 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(citations omitted). The Carter court described the sons' involvement in the
preparation of their mother's will as "the acts of dutiful sons who helped their
mother draw up her will and execute it" and noted that the mother "was aging
and needed helpful information and even advice." Id.
52. See, e.g., Bryan v. Norton, 265 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. 1980) (stating that
a showing that a testator acted freely and voluntarily, rather than under co-
ercion from a beneficiary, in the making of a will rebuts a presumption of un-
due influence); Maurath v. Sickles 586 S.W.2d 723, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(reversing the trial court on examination of the testatrix's susceptibility to in-
fluence and finding that the evidence did not support a finding of weakness of
mind or susceptibility to the influence of others); Lipper v. Weslow, 369
S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) (finding that the test for undue influence
involves an examination of whether a testatrix acted of her own will as evi-
denced by her susceptibility to the control of another).
53. The standards for mental capacity for purposes of writing a will are
generally very low. To make a will, the testator typically needs to know only
that he is selecting the persons to receive his property, what his property is,
who the natural objects of his bounty are, and what his duties are to such per-
sons and to his actual devisees. See Giurbino v. Giurbino, 626 N.E.2d 1017,
1026 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); see also ATKINSON, supra note 11, § 51 at 232
nn.1-4 (citing cases which held that an evaluation of the capacity of a testator
was the ultimate task of a court judging the validity of a will regardless of the
will's contents). For an early statement of this concept, see Wise v. Foote, 81
Ky. 10, 15 (1885).
In contrast, to make a contract, the individual's mental capacity must be
such that the individual understands not only the nature of the contract, but
the probable consequences as well. See, e.g., Mills v. Kopf, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80,
83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) ("The mental incapacity to avoid such a contract must
amount to an inability to understand the nature of the contract and to appre-
ciate its probable consequences."); DiPietro v. DiPietro, 460 N.E.2d 657, 661
(Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (stating that it is the general rule that it takes more
mental capacity to enter into a contract than it does to make a valid will). As
such, the lower standard of mental capacity for wills theoretically allows
transfers that are more arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Abel v. Dickinson,
467 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Ark. 1971) (stating that the "fact that a will is unjust,
unreasonable or unnatural does not affect its validity").
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evidence. A will that shows the effects of undue influence
through an "unnatural" bequest54 or gifts during life to a bene-
ficiary suspected of exerting undue influence 55 can also serve
as proof of weakened intellect and susceptibility to undue in-
fluence. This ability to prove susceptibility through an un-
natural will has the effect of eviscerating any independent
meaning from this requirement.
4. Unnatural Disposition
The rhetoric of undue influence frequently involves state-
ments that an unnatural will does not necessarily show that
undue influence caused the will.5 6 In accordance with freedom
of testation, it is said that "[t]he law does not constrain a testa-
tor to be just, or to recognize natural claims upon his bounty"
and that "[slo long as the will is his own and not another's, it
must stand."57 That being said, the catalyst and strength of all
undue influence cases is the perceived "unnaturalness" of the
testamentary disposition 58
When someone is unexpectedly disinherited from a will, it
is not surprising that the first thought may be that of foul play.
After all, it is easier to believe that one was disinherited due to
54. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507
(Ark. Ct. App. 1987) ("Evidence of an unnatural disposition of his property by
a testator is admissible to show a mind easily susceptible to undue influ-
ence.").
55. See, e.g., Estate of Auen, 35 Cal Rptr. 2d 557, 564-65 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that inter vivos transfers of property, jewelry, and money were
evidence that testator was susceptible to exploitation by her attorney and that
undue influence was exerted in procuring a will by which the testator's attor-
ney benefited).
56. See Abel, 467 S.W.2d at 155 ("he fact that a will is unjust, unreason-
able or unnatural does not affect its validity."); ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 255
(' U]ndue influence is not established by the inequality of the provisions of the
will."); BOWE & PARKER, supra note 23, § 15.8 ("The fact that a testator...
makes a foolish, unnatural or unjust will does not necessarily show that un-
due influence caused the will.").
57. In re Ruef, 167 N.Y.S. 498, 500 (App. Div. 1917), affd, 119 N.E. 1075
(N.Y. 1918).
58. As one court explained it:
Where the provisions of a will are unjust, unreasonable, and unnatu-
ral, doing violence to the natural instincts of the heart, to the dictates
of parental affection, to natural justice, to solemn promises, and to
moral duty, such unexplained inequality is entitled to great influence
in considering the question of testamentary capacity and undue in-
fluence.
Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct. App.
1987) (citing Brown v. Emerson, 170 S.W.2d 1019 (1943)).
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the Svengali-like influence of another over the testator rather
than as a reflection of the testator's true feelings. Thus, the
decision to challenge a will based on undue influence is almost
always the result of the heirs at law perceiving a will as
"unnatural."59 The strength of the undue influence claim is also
dependent on the perception of a disposition as "unnatural." It
is extremely difficult to convince a court that a disposition that
the court perceives as "natural" for the testator is the result of
someone imposing their will on that of the testator. For ex-
ample, in one case in which a son was named as the primary
beneficiary of his mother's estate, the court, in refusing to set
aside the will based on undue influence, noted that "[tlhe law
simply does not presume undue influence in the absence of
evidence of subservience on the part of the parent, especially
when, as here, conveying the property to the child was such a
natural thing for the parent to do."60
Thus, a critical question in the undue influence inquiry is
what makes a disposition "natural." One might be tempted to
posit that the determination of a "natural" disposition for a tes-
tator would involve a detailed factual inquiry into that person's
life and his or her subjective feelings. Instead, what one fre-
quently finds in the case law is a surprisingly straightforward
and objective response to the question of what constitutes a
"natural" disposition: a "natural" disposition is one which pro-
vides for a testator's heirs at law. As one court succinctly put
it: "[T]he natural object of a will maker's bounty is one related
to him/her by consanguinity."61 The status of the beneficiary,
rather than the quality of the beneficiary's relationship to the
testator, determines what is a natural disposition for purposes
of the undue influence analysis. In determining status, courts
have generally relied on the intestacy statutes as a model for
59. See Schoenblum, supra note 6, at 618 (suggesting that the prime mo-
tivation for will contests may not be financial, but rather that the contestants
may be motivated by a deeper psychological or emotional need to contest).
60. Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1994) (emphasis added).
61. In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273 (Okla. 1995). Black's Law
Dictionary defines the term "natural objects of testator's bounty" as those
people who would take under intestacy. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (6th
ed. 1990). Some cases refer to Black's Law Dictionary to determine what is
"natural." See, e.g., Needels v. Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). Black's provides that an "unnatural will" is a disposition to strangers
to the exclusion of the natural objects of the testator's bounty without appar-
ent reason. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1538.
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naturalness.6 A recent case involving a helpful neighbor who
was also a distant relative of the testator by marriage illus-
trates this approach .6  The neighbor had a long-term personal
relationship with the testator and had been provided for in an
earlier will, but was later effectively disinherited. The court
described the neighbor solely in terms of his consanguinity to
the testator and upheld the subsequent will, noting that "[a]
will leaving the bulk of [testator's] property to first cousins
rather than to a distant relative by marriage is not an unnatu-
ral disposition of property as claimed by [the neighbor] even if
it is not what others would have expected."' In sum, connec-
tions through affinity are generally considered only if the blood
relatives have behaved in such a way as to fall from their pre-
ferred status. Thus, reliance on people outside of the formal
family structure is only countenanced when the family has
done something to "deserve" being disinherited.65
Courts sometimes look to a prior will, if one exists, as evi-
dence of the naturalness of the disposition.6 6 However, the ef-
62. Based on this model, spouses and blood relatives are at the top of the
hierarchy for those who are considered to be the natural objects of a testator's
bounty. Thereafter it is siblings, and then more distant relatives, such as
nieces and nephews and cousins.
63. Matter of Estate of Lien, 892 P.2d 530, 534 (Mont. 1995).
64. Id. In Green v. Holland, 657 S.W.2d 572 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983), the is-
sue of status was applied in a notable way. In determining that it was natural
for the testatrix to prefer one nephew over other nephews and nieces the
court noted that although she had other kinsmen including nieces and neph-
ews, her relationship with Cliff Holland (the named beneficiary) was much
closer than with the others. Cliff Holland and his deceased brother, Jack,
were the children of one of her sisters. Their father was the brother of testa-
trhs second husband. For this reason they were referred to as "double neph-
ews." Id. at 576. The implication of this seems to be that in determining
status, a "double nephew" trumps a "single nephew."
65. Morse v. Volz, 808 S.W.2d 424, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In this case,
the testator's adult son had disclaimed kinship as a result of his widower fa-
ther's remarriage to a long-standing acquaintance. The new wife had driven
the testator to his attorney's office immediately after the wedding ceremony in
order to execute a new will which devised everything to her and her children
from a previous marriage in the event that she predeceased the testator. The
Missouri Court of Appeals held the will to be valid, questioning what disposi-
tion was "owed by a father to a son who has disclaimed their kinship." Id.
66. One court stated:
A prior will, executed when the testator's testamentary or mental ca-
pacity was and is unquestioned, and as to which the existence of un-
due influence is not charged, and which conforms substantially as to
results produced to the instrument contested, may be considered as
competent evidence for the purpose of refuting charges of undue in-
fluence or want of testamentary or mental capacity by showing that
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fect of this rarely differs from the above standard of natural-
ness. The reason for this is that if a testator provided for his
family in an earlier will and then provided for a person with
whom he had a confidential relationship, then the former will
frequently serves as evidence of the unnaturalness of the sub-
sequent disposition.6" However, if instead the prior will pro-
vided for a disposition to someone other than a family member
(i.e., a disposition which is perceived by the court as "un-
natural"), then rather than being taken as evidence of the
naturalness of the subsequent disposition, courts tend instead
to view the prior will as evidence of a testator's susceptibility to
undue influence. 68
II. FROM THE ANNALS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE
KAUFMANN CASE
In this Part, I test the dominant paradigm that the undue
influence doctrine acts to preserve freedom of testation by ex-
amining the doctrine through the lens of a particular undue
influence case from the 1960s: In re Estate of Kaufmann. In
this case the testator, Robert Kaufiann, left the majority of
his estate to his long time live-in companion, effectively disin-
heriting his brothers and nephews. Kaufinann wrote a letter to
his family explaining his reason for the bequest. Despite am-
ple evidence that the testator intended to make the bequest
that he did, three courts set aside his will based on undue in-
fluence. Unique aspects of this case make it particularly useful
for testing the dominant paradigm. This is one of the few cases
in which the testator's view of the relationship and his reasons
for the bequest are presented in his own words. Moreover, it is
particularly illuminating to look at a case from the past be-
cause it is easier to see how such a case reflects the societal
values of its times.69 This is particularly true when it involves
the testator (and grantor) had a constant and abiding scheme for the
distribution of his property.
In re Estate of Camin, 323 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Neb. 1982) (quoting In re Estate
of Bose, 285 N.W. 319, 329 (1939)).
67. See Needels v. Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(emphasizing a change from an earlier will that disinherited the testator's
children); In re Will of Kauffman, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 668 (App. Div. 1964)
(noting that an earlier will left the bulk of the testator's estate to his rela-
tives), aft'd, 205 N.E. 2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
68. See Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507
(Ark. App. 1987) (stating that evidence of an unnatural disposition by a testa-
tor can be used to show that the testator is susceptible to undue influence).
69. For a discussion of our inability to see many forms of discrimination,
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an issue about which views have changed, namely, what makes
a family. 70
A. CONFLICTING NARRATIVES
The story of Robert Kaufmann is told by two voices: Robert
Kaufmann's own, countered by that of the court.7 '
1. Background
Robert Kaufmann was a millionaire by birth72 and an art-
ist by temperament. Robert had two brothers, Joel and Aron.73
Aron was disabled and physically unable to participate in the
operation of the family business, and Robert had very little in-
terest in business matters.74 Therefore, after the death of Rob-
ert's parents, the family businesses were run primarily by Joel.
Until the age of thirty-four, Robert lived with his brother Joel
and Joel's two sons, Richard and Lee, in Washington, D.C.
75
In 1948 when Robert was thirty-four, he took up painting
and moved to New York City.76 Shortly thereafter he met Wal-
ter Weiss. 77 Robert and Walter's relationship was both profes-
sional and personal. Walter was initially employed to be Rob-
bias and prejudice as wrong at the time, see R. Delgado and J. Stefancic,
Symposium, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1277-79
(1992).
70. Increased recognition of same-sex couples constituting a family is re-
flected in part in judicial approvals of second parent adoptions by lesbian
partners. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993)
(allowing the lesbian companion of a natural mother to become a co-parent by
adoption).
71. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Forward: Telling Stories, Legal Story-
telling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (1989) (noting that the importance of
looking at the law from different perspectives is reflected in the legal scholar-
ship on narratives).
72. He was born in 1914 into a family that had a number of successful
family businesses including Kaufinann Furniture and Kay Jewelry Stores. In
re Will of Kaufinann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 673 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d
864 (N.Y. 1965).
73. Id. at 666.
74. Id. at 669. "The record shows beyond dispute that prior to 1948 Rob-
ert had no financial authority and had assumed none. His affairs were in the
hands of his brother Joel, whose holdings and financial interests were the
same as Robert's." Id. at 678.
75. Id. at 666.
76. Id.
77. In re Will of Kaufinann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666 (App. Div. 1964), affd,
205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). Weiss was an attorney, but was not practicing
law at the time he met Robert.
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ert's financial advisor at a salary of $10,000 a year.7 ' Robert
gave Walter a power of signature on all of Robert's accounts
and a general power of attorney including unrestricted access
to Robert's safe deposit box. Walter continued as Robert's fi-
nancial advisor until the time of Robert's death in 1959. Dur-
ing those years, Robert (as advised by Walter) and his brother
Joel frequently argued over the management of Robert's in-
vestments.79
Robert and Walter's relationship was primarily a personal
one. In 1949, Walter moved into Robert's apartment where
they lived together for ten years until Robert's death. Robert
and Walter shared interests in art and literature 80 and trav-
eled together extensively.81 For many years of their relation-
ship Robert gave Walter annual gifts of $3,000 (the maximum
amount which could be given free of gift tax in those years).
Robert also gave Walter the power to make decisions in the
event of Robert's illness or death. In the event that Robert was
incapacitated by reason of mental or physical disability, Walter
had the power to consent on Robert's behalf to the performance
of any operation he deemed necessary after consultation with
Robert's physicians. 82  As Robert stated in this document,
Weiss was to act "as though he were my nearest relative."83 In
the event of Robert's death, Walter had exclusive power over
Robert's corporeal remains and the authority to make all fu-
neral arrangements. 84
Robert executed a series of wills over the course of his re-
lationship with Walter. In 1950, Robert's will provided for
most of his property to go to his brothers, Joel and Aron, and to
78. Id. To enable Walter to manage Robert's financial affairs, the books
and records of Robert's family investments were moved from Washington,
where they had been kept in the Kaufmann family office, to New York, where
they were managed by Walter. Id. at 667.
79. Id. at 669
80. Id. at 686.
81. Id. at 687-88.
82. In re Will of Kaufinann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 673 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd,
205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). This was a health care proxy which is now rec-
ognized as a standard component to any estate plan. As evidence of the
changing times, in this 1964 opinion the court referred to this health care
proxy as a "most unusual document." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court appeared particularly troubled by this in that it noted
that "the complete, almost sacrificial surrender of his corporeal remains to
Weiss is most unusual." Id.
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Joel's children, Richard and Lee.85 From 1951 to 1959 Robert
revised his will five times. Each time he gave Walter a larger
share of his estate. In his final will, executed in June 1958,
one year before his death, Robert gave his interest in Kauf-
mann Furniture to his two nephews and left the remainder of
his estate to Walter.8 6
2. Robert Kaufmann's View of His Relationship with Walter
Weiss
Determining whether a will is the result of undue influ-
ence requires an inquiry into the state of mind of the testator.
As such, the difficulty with defending against charges of undue
influence lies in the fact that the best evidence, the testimony
of the testator, is not available at the time the will is being
probated.87 However, the Kaufmann case is unusual in that
Robert Kaufmann's statement about his view of his relation-
ship with Walter Weiss was presented in part through a letter
that Robert wrote to his family at the time that he executed his
1951 will. This letter was kept with all of the wills that Robert
Kaufmann executed until the time of his death. Robert wrote
that the purpose of this letter was to provide an explanation for
the disposition of a substantial portion of his estate to a man
who was "not a member of my family.""8 The letter describes
how when Robert first met Walter, Robert's outlook was then
"approaching the nadir"; he was a "frustrated time-wasting lit-
tle boy"; he was "terribly unhappy, highly emotional and filled
to the brim with a grandly variegated group of fears, guilt and
assorted complexes." 9 It expresses Robert's appreciation for
85. Id. at 687.
86. Id. at 677.
87. Three states have adopted ante-mortem probate statutes in an at-
tempt to address this problem. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (Michie
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.081 (Anderson 1987). This is a procedure whereby a testator can have
his will probated during his life to ensure that the will was properly executed,
that the testator had the requisite mental capacity, and that the will was free
from fraud and undue influence. The ante-mortem probate procedure has
been criticized by scholars, see, e.g., Fellows, supra note 13, at 1113 (arguing
that the undue influence doctrine protects testators from deception and du-
ress), and was not adopted by the Uniform Probate Code. It appears unlikely
that it will be widely adopted.
88. In re Will of Kaufinann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 669-71 (App. Div. 1964),
affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
89. Id.
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meeting Walter, who encouraged him to submit to psycho-
analysis.9 0 The letter goes on to state:
Walter gave me the courage to start something which slowly but
eventually permitted me to supply for myself everything my life had
heretofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent but strong creative
ability in painting * * * a balanced, healthy sex life which before had
been spotty, furtive and destructive; an ability to reorientate myself
to actual life and to face it calmly and realistically. All of this adds
up to Peace of Mind-and what a delight, what a relief after so many
wasted, dark, groping, fumbling immature years to be reborn and be-
come adult!
I am eternally grateful to my dearest friend - best pal, Walter A.
Weiss. What could be more wonderful than a fruitful, contented life
and who more deserving of gratitude now, in the form of an inheri-
tance, than the person who helped most in securing that life? I can-
not believe my family could be anything else but glad and happy for
my own comfortable self-determination and contentment and equally
grateful to the friend who made it possible.
Love to you all,
Bob.91
3. The Court's View of Robert Kaufmann's Relationship with
Walter Weiss
The court was considerably less impressed with Walter
Weiss than Robert Kaufmann appeared to be. The court's
opinion is replete with statements that make it clear the court
viewed Walter Weiss as an opportunist who took advantage of
a naive and innocent Robert Kaufmann. One subtle way that
the court expressed its view was in its nomenclature.
Throughout its opinion the court makes Robert Kaufmann ap-
pear child-like and innocent by referring to him as "Robert."
This contrasts sharply with the court's reference to Walter
Weiss as "Weiss." More directly, the court characterizes the
relationship as one in which Walter tricked Robert into believ-
ing that he was independent while all the time encouraging his
dependence on Walter:
Weiss and Robert lived together from 1949 to the date of Robert's
death. The evidence enabled the jury to find that Robert became in-
creasingly dependent on Weiss socially and businesswise. Moreover,
it supports the view that this dependence was encouraged and that
Weiss took affirmative steps to insulate Robert from his family and
persons he sought to cultivate.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Robert gave Weiss his unbounded confidence and trust. Weiss ex-
ploited Robert, induced him to transfer to him the stewardship for-
merly exercised by Joel, increased Robert's need for dependency, pre-
vented and curtailed associations which threatened his absolute
control of Robert and alienated him from his family.92
The court dismissed Robert's letter to his family, saying
that "the emotional base reflected in the letter of June 13, 1951
is gratitude utterly unreal, highly exaggerated and pitched to a
state of fervor and ecstasy."93 The court also criticized the let-
ter as "not based on reality"94 and proceeded to reinterpret
Robert's life, refuting each point that Robert made in the letter:
Robert had become aware of his desire to paint, had received instruc-
tion and had started painting prior to his meeting with Weiss....
Weiss had nothing to do with Robertes creative ability in painting. In
attributing to Weiss the "start [of] something which slowly but even-
tually permitted me to supply for myself everything my life had here-
tofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent but strong creative ability
in painting," the letter is not in accord with the record. Weiss in his
pre-trial statement acknowledged he did not know why Robert at-
tributed to him his painting career.
The letter refers to the "courage" acquired from Weiss "to supply for
myself * ** a balanced, healthy sex life which before had been spotty,
furtive and destructive." The implication is that Weiss in some fash-
ion was identified with Robert's sex life. Weiss' pre-trial statement
emphatically denied it.
To the extent that the letter implies or suggests a marked improve-
ment of a previously disoriented and fearful personality, it is again at
odds with reality as will appear. 5
Finally, even accepting the letter from Robert as "true,"
the court noted that the "services" provided by Walter did not
warrant such a large bequest.96
The court viewed the will as:
the end result of an unnatural, insidious influence operating on a
weak-willed, trusting, inexperienced Robert whose natural warm
family attachment had been attenuated by false accusations against
Joel, subtle flattery suggesting an independence he had not realized
and which, in fact, Weiss had stultified, and planting in Robert's
92. Id. at 679.
93. Id. at 674.
94. In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 672 (App. Div. 1964), affd,
205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
95. Id.
96. Id. "Assuming, however, the content of the letter, it completely fails
to explain the extent of the testamentary gift to Weiss tantamount to over a
half million dollars." Id.
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mind the conviction that Joel and other members of the family were
resentful of and obstructing his drive for independence.97
In short, the court found influence in the most significant
sense: Walter's influence was so insidious that Robert didn't
even recognize it.
B. THE PARADOX OF KAUFMANN
The decision in the Kaufmann case to set aside the will
based on undue influence seems to be in contradiction with
freedom of testation-the very principle that the undue influ-
ence doctrine purports to uphold. Yet, three courts determined
that this will was the result of undue influence.
It would be easy to dismiss Kaufmann as just another ex-
ample of judicial homophobia from an era in which courts and
society at large were openly prejudiced against homosexual
relationships.98 However, to categorize this case as an aberra-
tion, a misapplication of the undue influence doctrine, is to
miss the more significant lesson that this case offers. What is
notable about the Kaufmann decision is that it rests on firm
ground under the standard doctrinal undue influence analysis.
Changing mores have given us the opportunity to see this doc-
trine for what it is: an imposition of societal norms as to appro-
priate testamentary behavior.
Under the testamentary freedom model, the inquiry for the
court was purportedly whether the will accurately reflected the
wishes of the testator or of someone else. This inquiry is struc-
tured by the factors of the undue influence doctrine,99 all of
which existed in Kaufmann.
By holding a power of attorney and managing all of Rob-
ert's personal affairs, Walter easily fit the mold as the domi-
nant party in either a de jure or a de facto confidential rela-
tionship.' The establishment of a confidential relationship in
97. Id. at 684.
98. See Sherman, supra note 14, at 245-48 (suggesting that homosexual
"lover-legatee[s]" face greater obstacles at probate than their heterosexual
counterparts). Legal history is replete with unjust decisions that operate
against members of disfavored groups, and it is not surprising that such bi-
ases should extend into the law of wills as well.
99. HASKELL, supra note 18, at 44 (outlining the undue influence factors);
see supra notes 29-68 and accompanying text (describing how courts have in-
terpreted these factors).
100. Numerous cases have held that the existence of a power of attorney
given by one person to another is a clear indication that a confidential rela-
tionship exists between the parties. See, e.g., Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d
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and of itself goes a long way toward proving undue influence
since many courts have taken the position that the existence of
a confidential relationship combined with a benefit to the
dominant party in the relationship is enough to raise the pre-
sumption of undue influence." 1 However, the other factors
were also easily established in the Kaufmann case.
There was abundant evidence that Walter played a role in
the preparation and execution of the will.102 Robert was also
easily portrayed as a person who was susceptible to undue in-
fluence, as the court described him as "weak-willed, trusting,
and inexperienced."103 Robert had had little interest in busi-
ness and had been taken care of by his brother Joel.1 14 The
1378, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding that an elderly woman became de-
pendent on a person who had become her "advisor, counselor, and confidant").
The court here observed that "no clearer indication of a confidential relation-
ship [can] exist than giving another person the power of attorney over one's
entire life's savings." Id. (quoting In re Estate of Bankovich, 496 A&2d 1227,
1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). The court further noted that "[t]his is particu-
larly true ... when the alleged donee is shown to have spent a great deal of
time with the decedent or assisted in the decedent's care." Id. (quoting Hera
v. McCormick, 625 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). In addition, a confi-
dential relationship may have resulted as a matter of law because Walter was
Robert's financial advisor.
A de facto confidential relationship also existed in that, as the court
noted, "the evidence enabled the jury to find that Robert became increasingly
dependent on Weiss socially and businesswise." In re Will of Kaufmann, 247
N.Y.S.2d 664, 679 (App. Div. 1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). Walter
handled all of Robert's financial affairs. He kept his books and records, id. at
667, had access to all of his bank accounts and safe deposit box, id. at 670, and
advised him as to his choice of lawyers and doctors, id. Walter also handled
all of their living arrangements. He furnished their house, employed domestic
help, maintained the household and handled all mail and incoming calls. Id.
at 667.
101. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which
the court presumed undue influence when the plaintiff established the exis-
tence of a confidential relationship and the dominant party received an ad-
vantage).
102. Walter was responsible for displacing the attorneys who drafted Rob-
ert's earlier will, Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 679, he left Robert notes telling
him that he needed to revise his will, id. at 673, he introduced Robert to the
new attorney who eventually drafted the will that named Walter as the bene-
ficiary, id. at 679, and he sent the attorney copies of Robert's old wills with a
letter stating that Robert wanted his will changed, id. at 674. Moreover, the
fact that the will was prepared by a prominent Wall Street law firm with
reputable, competent attorneys did not preclude a finding of undue influence.
Id. at 684. As the court noted, "far more extensive interposition by independ-
ent counsel has been held to not be conclusive on the existence of undue in-
fluence." Id. (citing Smith v. Keller, 98 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1912)).
103. Id.
104 Id. at 679.
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court's theory of the case was that Robert tended to be depend-
ent on others and that he merely switched the object of his de-
pendence from his brother Joel to Walter. 1°5 The fact that Rob-
ert had made many gifts to Walter during his life served as
further evidence of his susceptibility. Finally, applying the
doctrinal theory of "naturalness," the court easily determined
that Robert's bequest to Walter was "unnatural." Comparing
Walter to Joel and his family under the standards of formal
status, Joel and his family were the clear winners. °6 The fact
that four prior wills provided for Walter and that each succeed-
ing will gave Walter a larger share was used as evidence of
Walter's influence and Robert's susceptibility to undue influ-
ence. Therefore, it was considered irrelevant for purposes of
determining what would constitute a natural disposition for
Robert.107
105. Id. at 681. Professor Shaffer concurs with this analysis and explains
it in terms of the psychological concept of transference. SHAFFER, supra note
17, at 242-46.
106. The standard of formal status explains the court's conclusion that
"[tlhe 1950 will [the one providing for his brothers and nephews] reflects a
natural testamentary disposition in the light of the nature and extent of Rob-
ert's estate, his family and his known relations to and with others." Kauf-
mann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 668. Evidence was presented in the case that Robert's
feelings changed towards his brother Joel between the time of the 1950 will
and the time of his later wills; however, this was merely interpreted as fur-
ther evidence of the undue influence exercised by Walter. As the court stated,
"The jury could have found, in addition, that Weiss conveyed to Robert false
accusations as to Joel's integrity and mismanagement of the family enter-
prises. If the accusations were intended to and did cause Robert to disinherit
members of his family in whole or in part, Weiss exercised undue influence."
Id. at 674. It is not at all apparent that Weiss's accusations concerning Joel
were false. In addition to their ownership interest in the family chain of jew-
elry stores, Joel and Robert each owned stock in the Fairfax Company, which
was the purchasing agent for the jewelry stores. At some time after Decem-
ber 1953, Fairfax merged with the jewelry stores. Weiss had opposed the
merger based on the ratio at which stock in the new Fairfax corporation would
be exchanged for stock of the old Fairfax company. Weiss strongly advised
Robert against the merger, which Robert conveyed to Joel in a letter. Id. at
673. Moreover, there was evidence that Joel received a higher price per share
than Robert was initially offered. Id. at 689. As a minority holder, Robert
was entitled to a statutory appraisal after the merger was completed. After
litigation Robert ultimately received $60,000 more than he was originally of-
fered for his shares. Id. at 673-74. The court largely dismissed the signifi-
cance of this matter by noting that this gain was "considerably less" than the
$120,000 loss incurred in another investment project that Weiss had pro-
moted to Robert. Id. at 680.
107. Id. at 683-85.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE PARADOX OF THE UNDUE
INFLUENCE DOCTRINE: THE CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP/NATURAL BEQUEST DICHOTOMY
The analysis of the Kaufmann case in Part II illustrates a
paradox in the undue influence doctrine. The doctrine pur-
ports, and in many cases acts, to protect an individual's free-
dom of testation by not admitting wills that represent the
wishes of someone other than the testator. Yet, as illustrated
in Kaufmann, the doctrine can also deny freedom of testation
for some individuals irrespective of the existence of substantial
evidence that their will represented their true wishes. This is
paradoxical because both results occur from the correct appli-
cation of the established doctrinal standards.
This paradox is the result of a misfit between the standard
for proving undue influence and its purported purpose of pro-
tecting freedom of testation. As Kaufmann illustrates, the
standard is over-inclusive for purposes of determining the exis-
tence of undue influence in that all of the factors can be pres-
ent in the situation where a will reflects the true wishes of a
testator. Moreover, the standard is also under-inclusive in
that the factors may be absent in the situation where the will
actually represents the wishes of someone other than the testa-
tor. For example, consider the situation in which an aged tes-
tator has two children--one who is well-off financially with a
secure career and the other who has no job and a child to sup-
port. The parent wants to give the bulk of her estate to the
child with the greater financial need. However, the other child
exerts pressure on the parent to provide for both children
equally. Responding to the pressure, the parent executes the
will benefiting both children equally (all the while saying to
herself, "This is not my wish but I must do it"). Regardless of
the fact that the will does not reflect the parent's true wishes,
it will not be set aside. The perceived "naturalness" of the dis-
position combined with the reluctance of courts to find a confi-
dential relationship among family members will prevent a
finding of undue influence.
Part IlI explores how the misfit between the standard for
proving undue influence and the stated purpose of the doctrine
of preserving freedom of testation is a result of the underlying
presumption behind the application of the undue influence doc-
trine: the confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy.
I suggest that the presumptive power of this dichotomy is so
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strong that it drives the undue influence doctrine, regardless of
evidence of testamentary intent.
A. THE EXISTENCE OF THE DICHOTOMY
The confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy
provides the underlying structure to the undue influence fac-
tors. That is, if there is a confidential relationship and the
confidant receives a benefit under the will, that raises the pre-
sumption that the will is the result of undue influence."' 8 On
the other hand, if the will represents a "natural" bequest-
traditionally meaning one in which all or most of the estate is
given to the testator's spouse or blood relatives-that generally
serves as overwhelming evidence that there was no undue in-
fluence.
The dichotomy is also reflected in courts' interpretation of
the term "confidential relationship." Courts are reluctant to
find a confidential relationship among spouses and blood rela-
tives. As discussed above, many courts take the position that
as a matter of law, there is no such thing as a confidential re-
lationship between a husband and a wife.1"9 For those states
that do recognize the possibility of a confidential relationship
between a husband and a wife, the application of the rule is
generally limited to second marriages where children from the
first marriage are disinherited."10 Moreover, in the spousal
situation, greater proof of undue influence is required because
of courts' determination that a person "naturally" has influence
over his or her spouse."' In cases involving other blood rela-
tives, courts are reluctant to categorize the relationship be-
tween the testator and the beneficiary as a confidential rela-
tionship (thus raising the presumption of undue influence) if
108. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (describing the ele-
ments that create a presumption of undue influence).
109. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the reluc-
tance of courts to recognize confidential relationships among family mem-
bers).
110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing one of the few
cases in which a spouse was found to have exerted undue influence). Pre-
sumably this is allowed due to a sense that it is "unnatural" to disinherit one's
children, even in the event of remarriage.
111. See HASKELL, supra note 18, at 45 (noting that undue influence often
reflects a "sense of offense" at outsiders who are disinheriting family mem-
bers).
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the disposition to the dominant party is perceived of as
"natural."'12
This failure to find a confidential relationship in the con-
text of the family is not because family relationships lack the
characteristics of dependence and reliance-indeed it is these
very characteristics that are the hallmark of the family rela-
tionship."' Rather, this systematic exclusion of families from
the confidential relationship category can be understood as a
result of an unconscious recognition of the problematic nature
of the confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy.
What are the characteristics presumed to be associated
with each of these categories such that they are treated as be-
ing in a dichotomous relationship? The presumptive character-
istics can be understood in terms of two related but separate
categories: the dependability of the relationships and the ap-
propriate ways of recognizing them. In particular, the un-
stated assumptions of the undue influence doctrine as ex-
pressed in the dichotomy are: (1) people can depend on spouses
and blood relatives to look out for their best interests; (2) non-
family members can generally not be depended on because they
will act selfishly; (3) people want to leave the bulk of their
property to spouses and blood relatives (regardless of the level
of services provided by the members of the family); and (4)
people want to benefit non-family members based on a contract
model (with bequests relative to the value of the services pro-
vided by the non-family member).
The Kaufmann case illustrates how these presumptions
operate in the context of the undue influence analysis. The
court described Robert's relationships with both his brother
Joel and with Walter Weiss in terms of Robert's role of depend-
112. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1994) (holding
that the trial court did not prove that the son unduly influenced the testator);
supra text accompanying note 42 (noting that courts are reluctant to charac-
terize a parent-child relationship as confidential if the disposition to the child
would be "natural").
113. The substantive similarity between confidential relationships and
family relationships was presented with unusual candor in a recent case in
which the court, in rejecting the will based on undue influence, described the
beneficiary as "a very skillful manipulator of emotionally immature, needy,
dependent women who were looking for someone to control their every action
and who had not found that need fulfilled by the husband or father in their
lives." Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1987).
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ence and reliance in the relationships.'14 Indeed, it was the
court's theory of the case that Robert merely switched the ob-
ject of his dependency from his brother Joel to Walter Weiss.
However, where the dependence on Joel was described as being
a "natural warm family attachment,"" 5 the dependence on
Walter Weiss was described as "unnatural""6 and "insidious.""I7
The court interpreted Robert's explicit statement that Walter
was to be treated "as though he [Weiss] were my nearest rela-
tive"'18 as merely further evidence of the unnaturalness of Wal-
ter's influence. The court was so locked in to the confidential
relationship/natural bequest dichotomy that it was unable to
accept that to Robert Kaufmann, Walter Weiss was family.
The notion that it is "natural" to leave the bulk of one's
property to blood relatives, whereas non-family members
should be compensated on a contract model relative to the
value of their services, is also well illustrated in Kaufmann.
Robert Kaufmann's 1950 will divided the bulk of his estate into
four parts, giving three of the four parts to Joel's family."1 9
Even though at the time of the bequest Robert was living with,
and entirely dependent on, Joel for management of his finan-
cial affairs, the court did not use the term "confidential rela-
tionship" (which, in conjunction with the bequest, could have
resulted in a presumption of undue influence). Instead the
court described this as a "natural testamentary disposition in
the light of the nature and extent of Robert's estate, his family
and his known relations to and with others."120 The court was
able to recognize the relationship between dependence and be-
quests as natural in the context of the family.
114. With respect to Joel, the court noted that "unquestionably Robert was
dependent on Joel as to matters of investments and management of his vari-
ous interests." In re Will of Kaufinann 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 678 (App. Div.
1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). Similarly, the court noted that
"Robert gave Weiss his unbounded confidence and trust. Weiss... induced
[Robert] to transfer to him the stewardship formerly exercised by Joel, in-
creas[ing] Robert's need for dependency...." Id. at 679.
115. Id. at 684.
116. Id. at 681.
117. Id. at 682.
118. Id. at 673.
119. The will left one part to Joel and one part to each of Joel's two chil-
dren. Id. at 667. The remaining part was left to Robert's other brother, Aron.
Id.
120. In re Will of Kaufnann 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 668 (App. Div. 1964), affd,
205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
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This contrasts sharply with the court's approach to the be-
quest to Walter Weiss under Robert Kaufmann's final will,
when the court applied a contract model to Robert's relation-
ship with Walter. After reviewing Robert's letter explaining
the bequest to Walter, the court noted that even if the letter to
Robert's family explaining the reason for his bequest to Walter
was "true," Walter's "services" did not merit such a large be-
quest.12 1 Under the court's view, since Walter was not a family
member, Robert, left to his own devices (i.e., without the undue
influence), would have compensated Walter under the contract
model. 122
These assumptions also operate in the context of the more
traditional undue influence case. For example, one typical un-
due influence fact pattern involves the helpful neighbor who
becomes involved with the aged testator late in the testator's
life. Typically in this situation the neighbor begins by doing
odd jobs around the house and eventually becomes very in-
volved in the testator's life-shopping, cooking, managing fi-
nances, and sometimes even feeding and providing other types
of basic home nursing care. 123 If the testator leaves everything
12L See id. at 672 (noting that the letter "completely fails to explain the
extent of the testamentary gift to Weiss tantamount to over a half million
dollars").
122. Id. For a discussion of the limitations of applying the contract model
to personal relationships, see Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Mar-
riage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1161-67 (1981).
123. See, e.g., Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (describing how an isolated elderly woman gave power of attorney to a
man who performed odd jobs for her). A similar situation involved the estate
of Pearl Rose of West Warwick, Rhode Island. Rose died in 1989 at the age of
86. She was a widow with no children. Her will made a number of specific
bequests and left "[a]ll the rest . . . to Lewis Everett Peck." The "rest"
amounted to about $20 million. Peck, who was 62 at the time, claims to have
known Rose since he was 10 years old. Both were active in town politics.
Peck claimed that he and Rose had made an oral agreement over a series of
years beginning in 1978. Under the agreement, Peck was to care for Rose if
she became ill; in return, she would leave him the bulk of her estate. Rose
executed the will that was submitted to probate in 1980, though it would be
1985 before Peck actually began to care for her. In 1986, Rose moved into
Peck's house, where Peck and his wife cared for Rose until her death. Rose's
family (which had been explicitly excluded in the will) told a different story,
claiming that Rose's mental state began to deteriorate in 1968 and that she
had suffered delusions for many years (though she was never hospitalized for
anything but physical ailments). The family noted that despite Rose's wealth,
her home had no heat, electricity or bathrooms. Various relatives claimed
that dogs, goats and livestock had free range of the house, that Rose ignored
personal hygiene and that portions of the home were in collapse. Other rela-
tives claimed that Peck had not allowed them to contact Rose while she was
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to the neighbor, disinheriting the family, the family will typi-
cally bring an undue influence case. These cases will fre-
quently be successful due to the acceptance of the unstated un-
due influence assumptions. Because the neighbor is not a
relative, there is suspicion as to motives-why is he all of a
sudden doing this? It must be for the money (blood relatives
act selflessly, but strangers act selfishly). The suspicions are
confirmed if the testator leaves the bulk of her estate to the
neighbor because of the assumptions that the old woman would
not disinherit her family of her own free will unless they had
done something to "deserve" disinheritance, and any bequest to
the neighbor would most naturally be based on the value of his
services.
B. CHALLENGING THE DICHOTOMY
The confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy
can be understood in terms of the larger context of the mar-
ket/family dichotomy discussed by Frances Olsen in her article
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Re-
form.1 24  She describes the market/family dichotomy as a
"structure of consciousness . . . a shared vision of the social
universe that underlies a society's culture and also shapes the
society's view of what social relationships are 'natural' and,
therefore, what social reforms are possible." 125 According to
Professor Olsen, the marketplace and the family have been
seen to exist in radical opposition to each other:
The marketplace was considered competitive, the family cooperative.
The marketplace was the arena in which individuals were supposed
to be most free to pursue their own interests without being responsi-
ble for the effects of their behavior on others. Indeed, an important
tenet of liberal ideology was that self-interested behavior in the mar-
ketplace not only was acceptable, but also benefited society in gen-
eral. The marketplace was animated by an individualist ethic; to act
selflessly was considered foolish as well as unnecessary.
In contrast the family was based on the ethic of altruism. Marriage
was seen as a decision to share a life together, and the common goals
of family life were supposed to supersede the egoistic goals of indi-
vidual members of the family. Neither husband nor wife was ex-
staying at his house. Some 44 cousins-many of whom had never met Rose-
filed suit against Peck claiming undue influence. Tina Cassidy, 44 Cousins vs.
A Caregiver; R.I. Woman's Will Faces Challenge, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22,
1991, at 25.
124. 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
125. Id. at 1498.
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pected to pursue selfish interests over interests of the other. Sharing
and self-sacrifice were considered appropriate family behavior.
126
Although Professor Olsen did not discuss this dichotomy in
the context of wills law, the market/family dichotomy provides
a context for the undue influence assumptions. The dichotomy
between confidential relationships and natural bequests makes
sense in a structure of consciousness in which the family is
perceived to be governed by an ethic of altruism, and relation-
ships outside the family are seen to be governed by an indi-
vidualist ethic.
Courts have interpreted natural bequests to be those be-
quests that are made to the testator's spouse and blood rela-
tives.'27 In the context of the market/family dichotomy, a be-
quest to family can be understood as natural because family
can be trusted to always act in the testator's best interest
(because this interest is governed by an ethic of altruism).
Confidential relationships, on the other hand, can be un-
derstood as relationships of the marketplace. The de jure con-
fidential relationships-lawyer-client, conservator-ward, trus-
tee-beneficiary, doctor-patient, nurse companion-patient, and
pastor-parishioner-all occur in the marketplace. De facto
confidential relationships are characterized as relationships of
the marketplace by the undue influence factors which effec-
tively exclude family relationships from this category. In the
context of the market/family dichotomy, bequests to people in a
confidential relationship can be understood as problematic
since the marketplace is a place where people act selfishly. If a
person, governed by an individualistic ethic, nonetheless per-
forms services for someone else, then it is appropriate to com-
pensate such services on a contract model basis, but a gratui-
tous transfer in this context seems inappropriate.
126. Id. at 1520-21. The continuing prevalence of this view is illustrated
by a recent California case in which the court held that a contract between a
husband and wife whereby the husband promised to transfer property to his
wife in exchange for her taking care of him at home after he suffered a stroke
was invalid for lack of consideration since the wife already owed her husband
such care because of her duty of support. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App.
4th 647, 654 (1993). The dissent noted that to contend in 1993 that such a
contract is without consideration means that if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill,
President Clinton "must drop everything and personally care for her." Id. at
660.
127. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (noting that courts are
more likely to view bequests to family members as "natural").
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The market/family structure of consciousness provides
justification for the undue influence doctrine assumptions on
the ground that people "naturally" leave most of their estates
to spouse and blood relatives because those are caring relation-
ships, and people do not leave bequests to those with whom
they are in a confidential relationship because they are market
relationships which people "naturally" recognize based on the
value of services provided. Thus, embedded in the undue in-
fluence analysis are two assumptions about the world: (1) fam-
ily relationships are co-extensive with caring relationships and
(2) confidential relationships are market relationships gov-
erned by an ethic of selfish individualism.
1. Family Relationships as Caring Relationships
The undue influence doctrine is built on the presumption
that family relationships are co-extensive with relationships of
trust and caring. 128  No doubt, many relationships between
spouses and among blood relatives are categorized by this ethic
of altruism. Moreover, there are clearly many relationships
outside the family which are governed by self-interest. How-
ever, one must question whether the correlation between car-
ing relationships and traditional family relationships is so
significant that it should serve as a presumption-particularly
when evidence exists in the form of a will that the testator be-
lieved otherwise.
There is an abundance of evidence that families are not
always governed by an ethic of altruism. Statistics on spousal
abuse, elder abuse and child abuse belie the notion that the
family relationship is always a relationship of trust and car-
ing.129 Moreover, short of abusive situations, many individuals
are estranged from their families.130
128. This is an issue that comes up in many areas of the law: whether it is
in the best interest of the child to be with adopted parents or biological par-
ents; whether parents can make the decision to institutionalize their children
against their children's wishes; and whether family members can make the
decision to remove someone from artificial life support. These are just some of
the areas of the law in which there are built-in presumptions that the family
is a place of caring governed by the ethics of altruism.
129. See, e.g., ABA, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 1(1994) (estimating that the number of women who experience domestic vio-
lence ranges from 1.8 to four million annually); ABA WORKING GROUP ON THE
UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RisM A
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 45 (ABA 1993) (detailing the large in-
crease in child abuse rates); DEFENDING OUR LIVEs: STUDY & RESOURCE
GUIDE 6-7 (Karen Strassler ed., 1993) (detailing the large increase in child
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Just as many family relationships are not always caring
relationships, the converse is also true-caring relationships
are not always found in traditional family relationships. Many
loving and caring relationships occur outside of the traditional
family structure. Relationships between same-sex couples are
particularly likely to fall into this category since the prohibi-
tion against marriage for same-sex couples denies them the
option of becoming a family in the traditional sense.131 How-
ever, caring relationships outside the traditional family struc-
ture are not limited to same-sex couples. People frequently
form family-type relationships with neighbors, friends, relig-
ious groups, and many other people outside of the traditional
family structure.
2. Confidential Relationships as Market Relationships
The undue influence doctrine is also premised on the as-
sumption that confidential relationships are appropriately rec-
abuse rates); Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Pro-
posal For Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 401, 403-06 (1995) (reviewing the statis-
tics on domestic abuse).
130. See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Coun-
sel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1580-85 (1996)
(arguing that numerous cases demonstrate that the interests of parents and
children do not always coincide and discussing, inter alia, cases involving psy-
chiatric commitments of minors by their parents, custody and visitation cases
in which parents disagree about the child's best interest or use the child as a
bargaining chip, and family disputes resulting from teenage pregnancy and
proposed abortions). See generally George Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child,
"Gregory K": A Child's Right to Be Heard, 27 FAMILY L.Q. 365 (1993)
(discussing a leading case in which a child in foster care initiated termination
proceedings to free him for adoption by his foster family when the state failed
to do so).
131. For articles discussing the prohibition against same-sex marriages,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1485-1510 (1993) (arguing that the institution of marriage, as a social
construct, should change to accommodate same-sex unions); Alissa Friedman,
The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages: Constitutional
Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
134, 137-66 (1987) (observing that the prohibition of same-sex marriages vio-
lates homosexuals' equal protection and substantive due process rights);
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 2 Wis. L.
REV. 187, 191-92 (1988) (noting that homosexual unions do not receive the
same benefits associated with heterosexual marriage); Otis R. Damslet, Note,
Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 561-91 (1993) (arguing
that denying homosexuals the right to marry denies same-sex couples equal
protection of the law); Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Marriage, the
Changing American Family and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 347, 350-91 (1993) (arguing that the prohibition of homosexual
marriage amounts to a denial of the due process right to privacy).
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ognized on a contract model. This is presumably based on the
notion that they are market relationships governed by an ethic
of selfish individualism. However, this assumption fails to rec-
ognize that the definition of confidential relationship is such
that people would often "naturally" want to recognize such re-
lationships with gratuitous bequests.
As discussed above, a confidential relationship occurs
whenever one is in a relationship of trust with and reliance on
another. The ability to depend on someone is entirely consis-
tent with wanting to benefit them under a will. In fact, confi-
dential relationships are the very type of relationships that
frequently (i.e., "naturally") result in bequests. As one testator
explained in her will:
I, Frances Owen, am quite alone in this world and I trust my cousin,
Mildred Hensel, to help me and I hereby consider that she is the
council [sic] and guide, and in the goodness of our hearts-I intend to
leave the assets that I have for my keep [sic] and declare the [sic]
Mildred is my heir.'3
It is as if she said, "I am in a confidential relationship with
Mildred and therefore she is the natural object of my
bounty."' 33
Ironically, it is this ability to depend and rely on others
that categorizes a family. Thus, the dichotomy between confi-
dential relationships and natural bequests reflects not only a
false dichotomy, but a polarization of equivalents.
C. THE EFFECT OF THE DICHOTOMY: A NEW PARADIGM-
FAMILY PROTECTION
The assumptions underlying the undue influence doctrine
as reflected in the dichotomy between confidential relation-
ships and natural bequests are nominally descriptive. They
purport to assist in determining the true intent of the testator
132. In re Estate of Owen, No. A-93-198, 1994 Neb. App. LEXIS 252, at *7
(Neb. App. Aug. 16, 1994). As Robert Frost described it, "Home is the place
where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in." Robert Frost,
The Death of the Hired Man, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 38 (Edward C.
Lathem ed., 1969). Another, perhaps less poetic way of expressing this senti-
ment is, "Home is the place where you have a confidential relationship."
133. This is entirely consistent with results of studies on the sociology of
bequests. One study found that the social setting in which people live is a
major determinant of how much wealth they eventually leave to family mem-
bers. This study found that elderly benefactors involved with cohesive peer
groups named family members as beneficiaries less often than those with
strong family connections. JEFFREY P. ROSENFELD, THE LEGACY OF AGING:
INHERITANCE AND DISINHERITANCE IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 62 (1979).
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by providing general norms for the way the world operates. To
the extent that the testator has deviated from such norms,
such deviance provides evidence that the testator was not act-
ing of his or her own free will.
However, although these assumptions are nominally de-
scriptive, the effect of the undue influence doctrine is to make
them prescriptive insofar as deviance from the norms serves as
compelling evidence that the testator was not acting freely.1 34
Thus, understood in terms of normative rules, the undue influ-
ence doctrine dictates that unless the family has done some-
thing to "deserve" disinheritance, the bulk of a person's prop-
erty should be left to his or her spouse and blood relatives.'35
This normative rule becomes prescriptive in that it is enforced
through the power of the undue influence doctrine. If the be-
quest fails to meet the prescribed norms, the will is set aside
and the property passes under the laws of intestacy.136 The
rules of intestacy provide for the property to pass to the surviv-
ing spouse and blood relatives. Thus, the impact of the undue
influence doctrine is to act as a form of forced heirship. People
can either provide for a "natural" disposition of their property
themselves (i.e., to their families) or the court will do it for
them via the intestacy statutes.
IV. TESTING THE PARADIGM OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AS
FAMILY PROTECTION: A TALE OF TWO STATES
The construct of the undue influence doctrine as a family
protection doctrine can be tested by checking for correlations
within jurisdictions between the level of protections against
disinheritance for family members and the standards for un-
due influence. If the purpose of the undue influence doctrine
is, as it is presented under the dominant paradigm, to protect
testator autonomy, then application of the doctrine should not
be affected by the level of protection provided for the family
against disinheritance because that would be irrelevant to
whether the testator's free will was overridden. On the other
134. The unnatural will does triple duty in that it provides proof of (1) the
testator's susceptibility; (2) the opportunity to exert influence; and (3) the un-
naturalness of the disposition.
135. In contrast, non-family members should receive benefits relative to
the value of their services, based on a contract model with such services being
evaluated under an objective arm's length standard.
136. Or, as in Kaufmann, property will pass under the terms of the last
"natural" will.
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hand, if the undue influence doctrine is primarily concerned
with protecting the family against disinheritance, then it
would be reasonable to expect that application of the doctrine
would be affected by the level of other protections for the family
against disinheritance. The greater the protections available
for the family against disinheritance, the less the need for the
application of the undue influence doctrine. Conversely, the
fewer protections for the family against disinheritance, the
greater the need for the undue influence doctrine.
Georgia and Louisiana provide two useful examples for
testing the family protection construct of the undue influence
doctrine. Georgia provides fewer protections for family mem-
bers against disinheritance than other states in that it is the
only state in the country that fails to protect a surviving spouse
against disinheritance. Louisiana provides greater protections
against disinheritance than other states in that it is the only
state in the country that protects children against disinheri-
tance. Examination of the application of the undue influence
doctrine in these states confirms the strong correlation be-
tween the existence of other family protection provisions and
the application of the undue influence doctrine. This provides
further support for my argument that the dominant purpose of
the undue influence doctrine is not to protect testators' auton-
omy, but rather to protect testators' families against disinheri-
tance.
A. GEORGIA
In every state except Georgia, a surviving spouse has
statutory protections against disinheritance. This protection
takes the form of community property in community property
states137 and elective share (sometimes called forced share) in
137. Under the community property system, a husband and wife are
deemed to be co-owners of all property earned during the marriage. The
community property system is based on the notion that a husband and wife
form an economic partnership and that they should share jointly the fruits of
their joint labors. Each spouse is an owner of an undivided half-interest in
the community property. The death of a spouse dissolves the community,
giving the surviving spouse outright ownership in half of the community
property. The community property system limits the problem of spousal dis-
inheritance since each spouse automatically owns a half-interest in all prop-
erty acquired during the marriage. For a recent review of an economic part-
nership justification for community property, see generally Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21 (1994).
The community property system exists in Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. In addition, Wis-
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separate property states.138 If the fundamental purpose of the
undue influence doctrine is to protect the family against disin-
heritance, as opposed to protecting testator autonomy, we
should expect to see a more liberal standard for the application
of the undue influence doctrine in Georgia in order to compen-
sate for the absence of these other statutory protections. This
is precisely the result.
consin, through its adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act, has a sys-
tem which is very similar to the community property system. WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 766.001-766.97 (West 1993). The remaining forty-one states and the
District of Columbia use the separate property system.
138. Under the separate property system, marital status does not affect
the ownership of property. Each spouse owns all that he or she earns and
there is no sharing of earnings. If one spouse is the wage earner while the
other spouse works at home, the wage-earning spouse owns everything. The
non-earning spouse has no ownership interest in any of the property held in
the other spouse's name. With the exception of Georgia, all separate property
states provide certain safeguards to protect the non-wage-earner from disin-
heritance by the wage-earning spouse.
Under the common law, surviving spouses were protected under the doc-
trines of dower and curtesy. These doctrines gave the surviving spouse a
fractional interest in the decedent spouse's real property. Most states have
supplemented or replaced common law dower and curtesy with some form of
an elective share statute.
Under conventional elective share statutes, the surviving spouse is
granted a right to claim a certain percentage share of the decedent's probate
estate (usually between twenty-five and fifty percent). The percentage share
depends upon whether the decedent left issue or other relatives in addition to
the surviving spouse. The percentage share allowed under conventional elec-
tive share statutes does not take into account the length of marriage. Thus,
the surviving spouse is entitled to the same portion of the decedent's probate
estate regardless of whether the marriage lasted for two weeks or fifty years.
Recently there has been a trend to move away from giving the surviving
spouse a flat percentage share based on the probate estate. For example, the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) has a new system in which a surviving spouse is
given a percentage share (ranging from three to fifty percent) based on the
length of marriage. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1993).
Many states have moved away from basing the elective share on the pro-
bate estate since, due to the prevalence of will substitutes (including life in-
surance and revocable trusts), the probate estate no longer provides an accu-
rate picture of the decedent spouse's assets. Under conventional elective
share statutes, a surviving spouse is entitled to claim his or her elective share
even if the decedent provided generously for the spouse through non-probate
transfers (e.g., life insurance) and even if the surviving spouse is wealthier
than the decedent spouse. In an attempt to more closely approximate com-
munity property systems, the UPC has adopted the concept of the "augmented
estate," which takes into account probate and nonprobate assets of both the
decedent spouse and the surviving spouse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203
(1993). For a more detailed discussion of the augmented estate (including ex-
amples of how to calculate the augmented estate), see John H. Langbein and
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL
PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 303, 317-25 (1987).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
1. Statutory Protections for Families in Georgia
Georgia is the only separate property state that fails to
provide any protection for a surviving spouse, either in the
common law form of dower/curtesy 1 39 or pursuant to a forced
share for a surviving spouse. 40 Georgia abolished dower in
1969. In that same year, the Georgia legislature specifically
rejected the notion of a forced share for a surviving spouse by
providing that "[a] testator may bequeath his entire estate to
strangers, to the exclusion of his spouse and children." 41 At
the death of a spouse there is no guarantee that a surviving
spouse in Georgia will receive any property from the decedent's
estate.
1 42
2. Undue Influence in Georgia
Although the Georgia legislature ostensibly provided that
a surviving spouse has no right to inherit, a disinherited
spouse was not left without recourse. The same provision al-
lowing disinheritance of a spouse went on to provide that "[iln
such a case the will should be closely scrutinized; and, upon
the slightest evidence of aberration of intellect, collusion, fraud,
undue influence, or unfair dealing, probate should be re-
fused."'43 Courts have interpreted "slightest evidence" to mean
139. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1995) (abolishing the right of dower in
Georgia); id. § 53-1-2 (stating that there is no tenancy by curtesy in Georgia).
140. See id. § 53-2-9(b) (expressly allowing disposition of a testator's entire
estate to strangers); see also Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Mod-
ern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 136-37 n.177 (citing both supporting
and contrary authority for the proposition that Georgia should allow a testa-
tor to disinherit spouses and children).
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1995).
142. The only exception to this is that a surviving spouse and minor chil-
dren may receive some short-term relief in the form of an allowance from the
estate for temporary support. Id. § 53-5-1. This statute provides that a dece-
dent's spouse may apply to the probate court for an award of a portion of the
decedent's estate sufficient to enable that spouse to financially support the
family for at least one year. However, a decedent spouse may easily avoid this
provision. See Peter H. Strott, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in
Georgia, 19 GA. L. REV. 427, 439 (1985) (noting that one spouse could easily
disinherit the other by transferring his or her assets into nonprobate assets).
143. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9(b) (1995) (emphasis added). In addition to its
undue influence provision, Georgia law has three other statutory protections
for heirs against disinheritance. The most substantial protection is in the
form of the "Year's Support" provision, providing that a decedent's spouse may
apply to the probate court for an award of a portion of the decedent's estate
sufficient to enable that spouse to have economic resources to support the
family for at least one year. Id. § 53-5-1. The two remaining protections are
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"the superlative degree of the adjective slight, and therefore
must mean very slight."1" This provision changed the common
law rule that a presumption exists in favor of probate of a
will. 145
The effect of this provision is to give freedom of testation
with one hand while taking it back with the other. If a testator
in Georgia chooses to disinherit his spouse and children, his
will is much more likely to be overturned based on the undue
influence doctrine. The irony of this is that as the testator's
will is being thrown out, it will be done so under the pretext of
preserving freedom of testation.
B. LOUISIANA
Louisiana is on the opposite end of the spectrum from
Georgia in terms of protecting the family from disinheritance.
Whereas all states with the exception of Georgia provide statu-
tory protections against spousal disinheritance, Louisiana is
the only state to protect children from disinheritance.1 46 The
protection for children is in the form of forced heirship, also
known as the legitime. If the purpose of the undue influence
doctrine is to preserve freedom of testation, then the existence
of this provision affecting the family should not affect applica-
tion of the doctrine. However, if the purpose of the undue in-
fluence doctrine is to protect the family against disinheritance,
then the existence of this strong family protection provision
would reduce the need for the undue influence doctrine. If this
is the case, then we should see less frequent application of the
undue influence doctrine in a state like Louisiana, which pro-
the Mortmain Statute, id. § 53-2-10 (disallowing a testator from leaving more
than one-third of his estate to charity, to the exclusion of a spouse or child,
unless the will containing the devise is executed at least 90 days before the
death of the testator), and the statute concerning a will executed due to mis-
take, id. § 53-2-8 (stating that a will executed due to a mistake of fact as to
the existence or conduct of an heir at law to the testator is inoperative).
144. Deans v. Deans, 156 S.E. 691, 699 (Ga. 1931). The Deans court fur-
ther noted that in adopting § 53-2-9(b) the general assembly sought to give
added protection to wives or children of testators. Id. at 698; see also Bow-
man v. Bowman, 55 S.E.2d 298, 308 (Ga. 1949) (noting that a transfer to a
stranger is permitted, but will be closely scrutinized); Smith v. Davis, 45
S.E.2d 609, 612-13 (Ga. 1947) (noting that the provisions of § 53-2-9 apply
only when the will completely excludes the party covered by the statute).
145. Strott, supra note 142, at 435.
146. Spouses in Louisiana are protected from disinheritance through
community property. See supra note 137 (discussing the community property
system generally).
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vides statutory protections for the family, than we see in other
states. This turns out to be the case.
1. Statutory Protections for Families in Louisiana
Although there is a general duty for parents to support
their children while the parents are alive, in every state, with
the exception of Louisiana, people are free to disinherit their
children at death. 4 Louisiana is the only state in the country
that provides statutory protection for children in the form of
forced heirship.'48 Forced heirship protects children against
disinheritance by securing for them a minimum share
(ranging between twenty-five and fifty percent of the dece-
dent's estate) which cannot be defeated by will or inter vivos
transfers. 4 9 The effect of forced heirship is a statutory system
whereby the children of a testator cannot be disinherited un-
less they do something to "deserve" disinheritance. 150
Forced heirship has deep historical roots in Louisiana
where it has existed since its settlement by the French in the
beginning of the eighteenth century. 5' In 1921, Louisiana ele-
147. The ability of a testator to disinherit his or her minor children has
been criticized, particularly in light of the support obligation during life. See
Brashier, supra note 140, at 133-37 nn.163-81 (citing the common law's com-
mitment to testamentary freedom, subject only to temporal financial allow-
ances to spouses or children awarded at the court's discretion).
148. Texas is the only other state that has ever tried forced heirship, a
remnant of the state's Spanish law history. After Texas entered the Union in
1846, the common law influence in this area became stronger and more ex-
pansive. Texas abolished forced heirship altogether in 1856. See Joseph Dai-
now, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and Louisi-
ana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42, 56-57 (1941) (discussing the origins and ultimate
abolishment of forced heirship in Texas).
149. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (West 1987) (providing that dona-
tions inter vivos or mortis causa may not exceed three-fourths of the property
of the disposer if he leaves one child and one-half if he leaves two or more
children); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44
LA. L. REV. 1553, 1570-73 (1984) (discussing Louisiana's forced heirship pro-
visions vis-A-vis community property and common law systems).
150. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (West 1987) (providing that a donor
may disinherit heirs for just cause).
151. Forced heirship was originally brought to Louisiana by the French
settlers. The French cession of Louisiana to Spain had no effect on the insti-
tution of forced heirship since Spanish law had its own forced heirship provi-
sions. After France regained Louisiana and conveyed the territory to the
United States, the inhabitants continued their civil law traditions, including
forced heirship. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (La. 1993)
(discussing the history of forced heirship in Louisiana). The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808 followed the Spanish rules regarding the legitime that a parent's
donations, either during life or at death, could not exceed one-fifth of his
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vated forced heirship to constitutional status by enacting an
amendment to the Louisiana Constitution that "[n]o law shall
be adopted that abolishes forced heirship."152 Although various
minor changes were made to the forced share statutes over
time, 53 Louisiana continued to protect children of all ages from
disinheritance until 1989.
In 1989, the Louisiana legislature adopted changes to the
forced heirship provisions that essentially eliminated protec-
tions for adult children against disinheritance. The most criti-
cal change was that the Louisiana legislature limited the pro-
tected class of children who are forced heirs to those children
under the age of twenty-three or those who, because of mental
incapacity or physical infirmity, are unable to care for them-
selves. 54 These changes were widely perceived as effectively
ending forced heirship in Louisiana.1 55 However, no sooner had
forced heirship been repealed in Louisiana, than the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared the repeal to be unconstitutional un-
property to the prejudice of his children and those of a child could not exceed
one-third to the prejudice of the parents. Id. When the Code was revised in
1825, the disposable portion was increased and, following the French Civil
Code, the protected share graduated in accordance with the number of chil-
dren. Id. at 1159-60. Such dispositions could not exceed two-thirds of the es-
tate if the decedent left one child, one-half if he left two children, and one-
third if he left a greater number. Id. Children of all ages were protected from
disinheritance by being guaranteed a minimum share that could not be de-
feated by will or inter vivos gratuitous dispositions. This provision was car-
ried over to the Revised Civil Code of 1870 as Article 1493. Id. at 1160.
152. This was contained in Article 4, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1921; the Constitution was superseded in 1974. The 1974 Louisiana Consti-
tution included a similar provision in Article XII, § 5 which stated: "No law
shall abolish forced heirship." LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (amended 1995).
153. For example, forced heirship originally protected parents as well as
children from disinheritance. Louisiana abolished ascendant forced heirship
which provided a minimum share for parents in 1981. See LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 1494 (West 1987) (noting that the legislature intended to abolish
the forced heirship rights of parents through the Acts of 1981).
154. The Louisiana legislature originally adopted language that provided
forced heir status for those children under the age of 23 or those who were
interdicted or subject to interdiction. Act of July 10, 1989, 1989 La. Acts 788.
The legislature changed the language in 1990 La. Acts 147 to the language in
the main text to avoid ambiguity by substituting the language of the Code
sections regarding interdiction. Act of July 1, 1990, 1990 La. Acts 147.
155. See generally Katherine S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Leg-
islation: A Regrettable 'Revolution," 50 LA. L. REv. 409, 437-38 (1990)
(expressing concern that the specific limitations defining forced heirship
would subject children to unjust disinheritance).
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der their state constitution. 156  Louisiana subsequently
amended its constitution to allow for the limitation of forced
heirship, and the statutory provision was reenacted in 1996.157
2. UNDUE INFLUENCE IN LOUISIANA
At the time of the adoption of the Civil Code of 1808, pro-
viding for forced heirship, the Louisiana legislature also
adopted a provision limiting the grounds on which a will could
be set aside. Specifically, the Civil Code provided that for
those attempting to annul inter vivos or testamentary trans-
fers, no proof would be admitted that the disposition was made
through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation.158 Judicial de-
cisions in Louisiana interpreted the term "captation" to be
identical to the common law concept of undue influence.1 59
Thus, until recently a contestant could not generally upset a
will based on undue influence. 160
The link between undue influence and family protection
was implicitly recognized by the Louisiana legislature through
its subsequent legislative actions. In 1989, when the Louisiana
legislature adopted the provision limiting forced heirship, it
repealed the statute prohibiting challenges based on captation,
or undue influence.1 61 The effect of this repeal was to introduce
the common law doctrine of undue influence 62 into Louisi-
ana.163 The judiciary also implicitly recognized the undue in-
fluence doctrine as a family protection provision. When the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the repeal of forced heir-
ship was unconstitutional, it also reinstated the provision
156. The court's holding of unconstitutionality was announced in the com-
panion cases of Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1165-66, 1172 (La. 1993)
and Succession of Terry, 624 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (La. 1993).
157. LA. CONST. art. XH, §5; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493, 1495, 1496
(West 1996), amended by Act of May 10, 1996, 1996 La. Acts 77.
158. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1492 (West 1987).
159. See Spaht et al., supra note 155, at 469 & n.247 (noting that a series
of cases from the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that undue influence
can be used in the same sense as captation and suggestion).
160. This rule did not apply to influence imposed at the time of the execu-
tion of the will.
161. Act of July 10, 1989, 1989 La. Acts 788.
162. See Spaht et al., supra note 155, at 470-74 (discussing the common
law doctrine of undue influence).
163. Id. at 411, 452-54.
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disallowing claims of undue influence." The subsequent
amendment to the Louisiana constitution and reenactment of
the limitation of forced heirship was coupled with the repeal of
the provision prohibiting challenges based on undue influ-
ence.
165
The irony of the Louisiana system is that although it was
widely perceived as limiting freedom of testation in that it im-
posed a forced share for the testator's family, in actuality it af-
forded greater freedom of testation than other states in that a
testator was truly free to dispose of that portion of his estate
(between fifty and seventy-five percent) that was not governed
by the forced share. This is in contrast to the forty-nine other
states that ostensibly have complete freedom of testation, sub-
ject only to a surviving spouse's share,166 but where the entire
will is subject to being thrown out if the undue influence doc-
trine is found to apply.
V. JUSTIFYING FAMILY PROTECTION: SOME
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
In the foregoing discussion I have shown how the effect of
the operation of the undue influence doctrine is not, as pre-
sented in the dominant paradigm, to protect freedom of testa-
tion, but rather to protect the testator's family against disin-
heritance. This part explores whether such a result can be
justified. If it can, the problem becomes merely one of disclo-
sure. However, if protection of the family at the expense of tes-
tamentary freedom cannot be justified, then the undue influ-
ence doctrine imposes a more substantive harm.
Let us return to the typical undue influence case of the
person who writes a will leaving everything to her "helpful"
neighbor on whom she has become dependent, effectively dis-
inheriting her children. What are some possible justifications
for throwing out this will? The dominant paradigm says that
the will is not given effect because it does not reflect the wishes
164. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1171-72 (La. 1993) (noting
that the undue influence provision was void since the legislature only passed
it in connection with the limitation on forced heirship).
165. See Act of July 29, 1995, 1995 La. Acts 1180 (repealing Article 1492 of
the Louisiana Civil Code).
166. This is true under both community property and elective share sys-
tems. See supra notes 137-38 (discussing the community property and sepa-
rate property systems in the United States and the right of surviving spouses
under those systems).
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of the testator.1 67 However, as we saw in Kaufmann, the undue
influence doctrine can apply irrespective of the testator's
wishes, because the doctrine is driven by a false dichotomy be-
tween confidential relationships and natural bequests. The ef-
fect of this is that rather than protecting the testator's freedom
of testation, the doctrine instead acts to protect family mem-
bers from being disinherited. 168 In this section, I explore some
possible justifications for this result imposed by the application
of the undue influence doctrine. In particular, I examine the
following possible justifications for rejecting the will in spite of
the testator's intent: (1) the will does not represent what would
be the wishes of the testator if the testator was not in a de-
pendent relationship (I call this the "modified testamentary
freedom model"); (2) children have a reasonable expectation
that they will inherit their parents' property and this expecta-
tion should be fulfilled (I call this the "expectation model"); or
(3) children have a right to inherit their parent's property (I
call this the "family rights model").
I will consider each of these proposed justifications below.
A. THE MODIFIED TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM MODEL
The modified testamentary freedom model is similar to the
dominant paradigm in that both attempt to justify throwing
out the testator's will based on a determination of the testator's
intent. Whereas the dominant paradigm justifies throwing out
the testator's will on the presumption that the will does not re-
flect the testator's wishes at the time of execution, the modified
testamentary freedom model acknowledges that the testator
may have intended to make the disposition under the will, but
nonetheless rejects the will in recognition of the fact that de-
pendencies affect people's decisions. Under this justification
167. Another justification which is sometimes put forward is that if we let
the neighbor inherit, it will encourage gold-digging which could result in peo-
ple benefiting from their wrongdoing. However, I have shown how the doc-
trine does not prevent wrongdoing, it merely prevents wrongdoing which re-
sults in wills that a court perceives as unnatural. If a person exerts efforts on
a testator that cause her to make a will for the benefit of her children in equal
shares (even if she feels that such a will is not the one she would ordinarily
want to make) then that will not be set aside based on undue influence. The
undue influence doctrine prevents both wrongdoing and right-doing in favor of
non-family members and does not prevent wrongdoing in favor of family
members.
168. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (arguing that the un-
due influence doctrine is primarily a tool to protect family members from dis-
inheritance).
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for the undue influence doctrine, the will is rejected because it
does not reflect what the testator would have intended had the
testator not been dependent. As applied to the Kaufmann case,
the issue would not have been what Robert intended, but in-
stead would have involved a determination of what Robert
would have intended had he not been dependent on Walter.
169
This distinction between intent and presumed intent can
be illustrated by reference to the story about the snake pit and
the ladder presented by Joseph Singer in his article The Reli-
ance Interest in Property:
Suppose that you have fallen into a deep pit filled with poisonous
snakes. I come along and observe you in the pit. I am not responsi-
ble for your predicament and have no legal duty to help you. I offer
to sell you a ladder in exchange for half your future earnings. You
agree to buy; I agree to sell. It is a Pareto superior exchange; you are
happier with your life and half your future earnings than the alter-
native; I am happier as well with this outcome. Is the contract volun-
tary? There is no simple answer to this question. You obviously felt
forced to agree; you paid an awful lot for the ladder. But you also
benefited substantially by the deal.170
There are many public policy reasons why this contract
should not be given effect by a court. At the very least, the
person with the ladder is engaging in price gouging. Moreover,
even if the person in the pit intended to make this exchange
(because he is better off with it than without it), the intent is
not pure because without the situation of the snake pit, the
person would not have entered into this arrangement.
This story is easily modified to appear to provide compel-
ling support for the undue influence doctrine as justified by the
modified testamentary freedom model. Under the modified
testamentary freedom model, the dependent testator who gives
everything to her neighbor is in much the same position as the
person in the snake pit. By virtue of her dependence, the tes-
tator is willing to give everything to the neighbor. She might
freely execute the will (meaning she has the intention to do so),
but she does so with the knowledge that if she was not depend-
ent then she would not do it. 7' This construct makes undue
169. Professor Shaffer likens dependence in the context of undue influence
to the concept of transference. SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 242-46.
170. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
614, 648-49 (1988).
171. Presumably she would instead compensate the neighbor under the
contract model relative to the value of the services he provided. See supra
notes 121-122 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the con-
tract model of personal relationships to the Kaufmann case).
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influence similar to duress in that in both situations there are
external forces that make the testator do that which she oth-
erwise would not. The difference is that in duress, the benefi-
ciary created the source of difficulty which caused the will to be
made (for example, by holding a gun to the testator's head)
whereas in this construct of the undue influence doctrine, the
person merely took advantage of the situation in which he
found the testator.
Although initially appealing, this model is premised on
several troubling assumptions about the world. In particular,
this model relies on the notions that (1) a person's natural
state is one of independence from others (just as a person's
natural state is one outside a snake pit) and (2) for people who
are dependent on other people, it is possible to determine what
their intentions would be if they were not dependent.
The notion that people's natural state is one of independ-
ence from one another belies everything that we know about
human anthropology. Humans are social creatures who most
commonly depend on others for survival. Indeed, to the extent
it can be said that humans have a "natural" state, that state
has to be a state of dependence. 72
The other premise on which the modified testamentary
freedom model is based is that for people who are dependent, it
is possible to determine what their intentions would be if they
were not dependent. Just as we can determine that the person
in the snake pit would not make that arrangement if he were
not in that situation, the modified testamentary freedom model
presumes that we can determine that if the testator were not
dependent, then she would not leave the bequest to her neigh-
bor. However, the reason that we can determine that the con-
tract in the snake pit story is unfair is because we can compare
the value of the ladder relative to the price that was paid. Be-
cause these values (as established by people in their natural
state, i.e., out of a snake pit) are not even remotely comparable,
we say that the contract is arguably unfair. However, unlike a
transfer pursuant to a contract, a bequest is a gratuitous trans-
fer for which there is never any direct consideration. This ab-
sence of consideration makes bequests inherently unbalanced
and makes it impossible to determine what a rational person
would do in the absence of a dependent relationship.
172. This state of dependence, in large part, may explain the importance of
family in human relations.
622 [Vol. 81:571
UNDUE INFLUENCE
B. THE EXPECTATION MODEL
When one thinks about the paradigmatic undue influence
story from the disinherited children's point of view, it is easy to
sympathize with their plight. Loss of inheritance is upsetting
for financial reasons, but even more so for its psychological toll.
Disinheritance is often experienced as a statement about the
testator's feelings. The testamentary freedom model is most
satisfying from the children's point of view because it explains
the disinheritance as an overbearing of the testator's will.
However, even without this independent justification, one
could justify invalidating the will based solely on the legitimate
expectations of the children.
The law fulfills expectations in many situations. 17 3 How-
ever, in order to have expectations to receive property fulfilled,
these expectations must be based on some recognized right or
interest. An art thief might expect to be able to acquire and
keep a valuable Matisse painting, but expectation on its own is
not sufficient justification for a court to fulfill it. Moreover, in
cases arising under the undue influence doctrine, expectations
have often developed on both sides. When the testator disin-
herits her children in favor of her neighbor, arguably the
neighbor as well as the children expect to inherit. Thus, expec-
tations alone are not sufficient to justify a result in a particular
case. In order for the children's expectations to be fulfilled,
they need to combine their expectations with an independent
rightful claim. Thus, the expectation model on its own cannot
justify the undue influence doctrine in its current form. How-
173. For example, in contract law, courts under certain circumstances will
uphold the expectations of an offeree based on the offeree's reliance on the
promises of the offeror. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.24 (2d ed.
1990). In extreme cases, the court may even uphold the reliance based expec-
tations of a would-be offeree even in the absence of an actual offer. See Hoff-
man v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (holding that if a
promisor has reason to foresee the action of a third party in reliance on a
promise, in some cases justice may require compensation for the broken
promise). Similarly, property law will uphold the expectations of an adverse
possessor of real property if the adverse possessor establishes and maintains
certain interests in the property. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES
E. KRIER, PROPERTY 121-25, 135-41 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the series of re-
quirements necessary to gain title to property through adverse possession and
the policy considerations behind that doctrine). Adverse possession may also
extend to personal property under conditions similar to those applied to real
property. See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Adverse Possession: Acquiring Title to
Stolen Personal Property, 10 PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 12 (noting
that in certain circumstances even a thief or bona fide purchaser of stolen
goods can obtain title by meeting the requirements of adverse possession).
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ever, the family rights model described below may provide the
rightful claim which, combined with the expectation model,
could justify the undue influence doctrine acting as a form of
forced heirship.
C. THE FAMILY RIGHTS MODEL
Should an individual's family (meaning spouse and blood
relatives) have a right to inherit that person's property, such
that the family's right should trump the individual's ability to
dispose of his or her property at death?174 This has been the
understanding in many different cultures, both historically and
today.'75 The justifications for this right stem from notions
that (1) the family is an economic unit and therefore, regard-
less of how wealth is nominally titled, it represents the prop-
erty interests of all the members of the family, and (2) there
should be a general obligation of support among family mem-
bers such that family property should always devolve among
family members. However, as I show below, societal changes
as well as changes in patterns of wealth transmission suggest
that the family rights model can no longer justify the undue
influence doctrine operating as a form of forced heirship.
174. A spouse is already granted a right to a portion of a decedent's estate
in every state, with the exception of Georgia, under community property law
or the elective share. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text
(discussing the community property and elective share system in the United
States and Georgia's unique method of distributing the property of a dece-
dent's estate to a spouse). However, this right generally only attaches to a
small portion of the decedent spouse's estate. For example, in Massachusetts
the surviving spouse typically receives a life estate in one-third of the dece-
dent spouse's estate. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191, § 15 (West 1994).
175. The institution of requiring people to provide for their families (called
"forced heirship") has a long history. An early French commentator, Louet,
writing in 1693 claimed to find scriptural authority for forced heirship in the
books of Genesis and Numbers. Thomas B. LeMann, In Defense of Forced
Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 20, 20 (1977). However, most authorities trace
forced heirship back to Roman law in the form of the Querela Inofficiosi Tes-
tamenti ("plaint of an unduteous will") through which disappointed heirs
could claim a portion of a testator's estate. W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW'S SHARE 280 (1960). The Querela was based upon the ancient idea of
family ownership that a testator is under a duty to provide after his death for
those related to him by near kinship. Id. The amount that could be obtained
was at first discretionary, but eventually was fixed by statute as one-fourth of
what the claimant would have received as his intestate share. Id. Justinian
later increased this amount in the case of children to one-third if there were
not more than four children and one-half if there were more than four chil-
dren. Id.
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The family rights model can be best understood in the con-
text of a pre-industrialized world in which the majority of fam-
ily wealth was held in the form of a family farm or business in
which the whole family participated.'76 Education consisted of
the older generation teaching the younger generation the tools
of the family trade, and the whole family was involved in the
production of wealth through their labor.17 7  In addition, in
earlier times it was much more difficult to live by one's skills
alone; therefore, ownership of a farm or business played an im-
portant role in securing family wealth.178
The transmission of this wealth generally occurred upon
the death of the father by means of intestacy or through the fa-
ther's will. To the extent there was a surviving spouse, she
was generally provided a life estate in the form of dower.17 9
The purpose of giving the surviving spouse only a life estate
was to ensure that the family wealth would eventually pass to
the next generation whose members had already been em-
ployed in the enterprise. 8 °
In this world, it is easy to understand the importance of an
undue influence doctrine acting as a form of forced heirship.
Participation in the family enterprise can be seen as having
created an implied contract between the generations. The
younger generation committed to learning and supporting the
family business in exchange for which the older generation
agreed to transfer the enterprise to the younger generation
upon death. This intergenerational contract was also evident
in the social structure in which they lived. The younger gen-
eration frequently shared living space with the older genera-
tion and thus was able to provide care for the elderly in their
own home. This system required a level of trust by the
younger generation that they were not going to lose their live-
lihood because of a last minute whim by the father.181 Thus,
176. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 725 (1988).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 725-26.
180. Id. at 726.
181. The children did not need to worry about actions by their mothers due
to the numerous factors which led to women generally not being in the posi-
tion to transfer property at death. In particular, the separate property states
continued to follow the basic principles of the English marital property system
through much of the early history of this country. The English system traced
its origin to feudal roots and was based on the needs of the patriarchal landed
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the undue influence doctrine served as a valuable safeguard
against this potential "breach of contract."
Fast forward to the late-twentieth century and the world of
family wealth has changed dramatically. The corporation,
rather than the family, is the typical unit of production.182 The
notion of partnership no longer characterizes the family as a
whole, but instead applies to the marital unit.83 People earn
their wealth through salaries, from their individual participa-
tion in the predominantly corporate world, and through their
investments in this world in the form of stock and other finan-
cial instruments.'84 Moreover, education has become the domi-
nant mode of transmitting wealth from the older generation to
the younger generation for most American families. 8 ' This
class to keep their estates intact, under the control of one male. A married
woman was to be supported and maintained for her entire life, but she was
generally not entitled to exercise powers of ownership. At the instant of mar-
riage, the woman's ownership was limited to her paraphernalia (i.e., clothing
and ornaments). DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 173, at 367. In all other
respects, she became a femme covert, under the coverture of her husband. All
other personal property owned by the woman at the time of her marriage or
acquired thereafter (including her earnings) became the property of her hus-
band. Id. Marriage did not deprive the woman of title to her real property,
but the husband had the right of possession (known as jure uxoris) to all real
property that the woman owned at the time of the marriage or acquired dur-
ing the marriage. Further, this real property was alienable by the husband
and could be reached by the husband's creditors. Id. at 368.
This transfer of property rights upon marriage was largely a one way
street. The wife received only a right of dower, which remained inchoate until
the death of the husband. Id. at 400. Upon the husband's death, the wife re-
ceived a life estate in one-third of the husband's freehold lands. Id.
In 1839, Mississippi passed the first Married Women's Property Act in
this country. Id. at 368. By the end of the nineteenth century, all separate
property states had adopted similar Acts. Id. These statutes removed the
provision of coverture and gave a married woman (like a single woman) con-
trol over her property. The woman's property remained separate property,
immune from her husband's debts. The woman also retained control over all
her earnings from outside the home. Id.
182. Langbein, supra note 176, at 727-28.
183. See generally Waggoner, supra note 137, at 23-27, 43-44 (discussing
the partnership theory of marriage and its implications upon the allocation of
property within a marriage upon death or dissolution).
184. See Langbein, supra note 176, at 729 (suggesting that the three domi-
nant modes of financial intermediation are the corporation, banking, and the
insurance industry).
185. Id. at 730. According to Langbein, only two percent of the population
of the United States was graduating from high school in 1870. Id. In that
year, institutions of higher learning conferred 9,371 bachelor's degrees in this
country and exactly one doctorate. Id. By 1970, over seventy-five percent of
the population was graduating from high school and more than one million
degrees from institutions of higher learning were conferred, including some
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change in the patterns of wealth transmission is described by
John Langbein as follows:
[In modem times the business of educating children has become the
main occasion for intergenerational wealth transfer. Of old, parents
were mainly concerned to transmit the patrimony-prototypically the
farm or the firm, but more generally, that "provision in life" that res-
cued children from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer. In today's
economic order, it is education more than property, the new human
capital rather than the old physical capital, that similarly advantages
a child. 1
86
A critical feature of this new form of wealth transmission
is that, rather than occurring at death thorough wills or intes-
tate succession, such transfers typically occur during the life-
time of the older generation in the form of tuition and other
support through our lengthy education process.1 17 The younger
generation is expected to make its livelihood based on its de-
velopment of this investment in human capital rather than
through holding property. Moreover, due to changing demo-
graphics and the increased geographical distances among fam-
30,000 doctorate-level degrees. Id. Even as recently as 1940, less than five
percent of the American population had completed four or more years of uni-
versity study; by 1985, this figure had reached 19.4%. Id.
The equivalent monetary figures associated with education have in-
creased equally dramatically. Total expenditures for formal education in the
United States are estimated at $9.2 million in 1840. This figure increased to
$290 million in 1900, id., and to $282 billion by 1987. This latter figure was
the equivalent of seven percent of the gross national product. About forty
percent of this amount went to higher education. Id.
While Langbein notes a number of weaknesses in looking at the gross
statistics, he nonetheless concludes that even after allowing for scholarships,
loans and student labor, the main burden for the vast expansion in education
expenses falls upon parents. Id. at 732.
186. Id. at 732-33. It is interesting to note that these same societal
changes have been credited with allowing the development of the gay identity.
John D Emilio has argued that the decline of a system in which the nuclear
family is an economic unit of production, and the corresponding rise of a capi-
talist wage labor market, enabled the "formation of urban communities of
lesbians and gay men and, more recently, of a politics based on a sexual iden-
tity." John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF DESIRE:
THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 100, 104 (Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
187. Langbein, supra note 176, at 735. "Education is displacing inheri-
tance, lifetime transfers are displacing succession on death." Id. As Langbein
notes, this displacement effect occurs even for those families that get sub-
stantial amounts of student loans. Id. First, the loan amounts depend to a
large extent on the family's existing wealth. Id. at 734-35. The greater the
family wealth, the higher the fraction of college costs that parents are ex-
pected to transfer to the child in support of the child's education. Id. at 735.
Second, the loans eventually have to be repaid. In effect, money for college
comes either from savings (i.e., the family's current capital) or from borrowing
against the family's future capital. Id. at 734-35.
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ily members, the younger generation is often not able to pro-
vide direct care for its elders.
These changes in family wealth have already been re-
flected in recent changes which have taken place in the area of
spousal shares. As discussed above, one of the justifications for
limiting a surviving spouse's share to a life estate was the no-
tion of a family partnership. 88  To protect the younger-
generation partners it was important to limit the surviving
spouse' s rights. Today we view the marital union, rather than
the entire family, as participating in the partnership.'89 When
one spouse stays at home to raise the children, that is recog-
nized as assisting the out-of-home spouse participate in the la-
bor force. 9 ° With the notion of marriage as a partnership, pro-
tecting children's interests at the expense of the surviving
spouse has lost some of its legitimacy. Thus, intestate laws
and spousal share provisions have moved towards giving a
surviving spouse outright control of a larger portion of the de-
cedent spouse' s estate.' 91
The components of the implied intergenerational contract
that were evident in earlier times are missing from the social
structure of the late-twentieth century. Given that this is the
case, the extent to which the undue influence doctrine should
188. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing how limit-
ing a surviving spouse's share to a life estate facilitates enforcement of the
intergenerational contract).
189. In contrast to the marital union, which is characterized as a bilateral
partnership, the relationship between the parent and child is better under-
stood as imposing unilateral obligations on parents. Parents owe a duty of
support to their minor children regardless of their feelings. See KINDRED
MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 44-56 (Diana T. My-
ers et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that the nonconsensual, involuntary relationship
between family members creates a type of communal responsibility which
varies according to an individual's membership within the family unit).
190. This contrasts with children's labor which, in upper income families,
typically does not go to support the other members of the family.
191. See IRA M. BLOOM, STUDY OF ELECTIVE SHARE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992), at A-5, A-9 (listing the elective share percentages for
the forty-one states using a non-community property system and noting which
of these states has an elective share system that entitles a surviving spouse to
outright ownership of the property) (on file with author). See generally Wag-
goner, supra note 137 (discussing the historical transitions of the marital
property regime and its implications on spouses, particularly with respect to
the division of property at divorce and death). The exception is the situation
when the decedent has children from a prior marriage. The Uniform Probate
Code recognizes this in its intestacy statute which provides a greater share for
issue when there are children from a prior marriage. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
2-102(4) (1993).
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be available to serve as an enforcement mechanism to this
implied intergenerational contract is also brought into ques-
tion.
CONCLUSION
The undue influence doctrine has consistently been pre-
sented under the dominant paradigm as a doctrine that pro-
tects freedom of testation. Understood in this way, the doc-
trine has received widespread support. In this article I have
demonstrated that rather than protecting freedom of testation,
the doctrine denies freedom of testation to those testators who
deviate from prescribed testamentary norms in failing to pro-
vide for their families.
The issue of whether family protection can be justified is
one which is in need of further inquiry. I have begun this in-
quiry by considering three different models for justifying fam-
ily protection. My initial analysis suggests, however, that
modern trends of family wealth transmission combined with
the prevalence of non-traditional families make family protec-
tion much more difficult to justify than in the past.
What is the future of undue influence? The answer to this
question depends on which version of undue influence is at is-
sue: the mythical doctrine which protects freedom of testation
or the actual doctrine which protects family members from
disinheritance. If the mythical version which protects freedom
of testation beyond the doctrines of fraud and duress is to be-
come reality, then the confidential relationship/natural bequest
dichotomy must be abandoned. On the other hand, if the doc-
trine is to be maintained in its current form, then courts and
commentators must seriously explore its justifications before
rushing to surround it with a new myth.
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